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A Statement from the Editors
Welcome to our second issue of Choices. We would like
to draw your attention to several changes we have made
during our editorship and then ask for your help.
• First, we have tried to improve the accessibility of
Choices to those who want a hard copy. With this issue,
we introduce a whole issue PDF copy that people can
download and, if desired, print.
• Second, we are trying to improve the referencing char-
acteristics of Choices. We have defined a volume num-
ber and page numbers across the whole document to
allow typical journal referencing style. We are also peer
reviewing all pieces so Choices is without question
includable in the refereed article section of a vita.
• Finally, we have included references to a page we will
keep updated on our thematic coverage schedule, indi-
cating both past and future topics. In that list, the tim-
ing of distant pieces may not always be right, but the
list of covered topics will be. We provide this as we
have discovered a number of people who want to join
the theme and others that were surprised to find that
an idea they had was already in progress.
Beyond this, we would like to request your help in two
ways:
• First, please send us content. High-quality issues
require high-quality content; we would like to see the
profession help us by contributing more content. We
would really like to see a significant increase in the
number of thematic submissions and an enhancement
in the stream of Grab Bag submissions. For submission
requirements, see http://www.choicesmagazine.org/
submissions.htm.
• Second, please help us reach people with mailing lists
who can join in our outreach partner campaign. See
our plea and forms to nominate or agree to be a part-
ner at http://www.choicesmagazine.org/outreach.htm.
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Ag Committee Leaders—109th Congress. Republican Repre-
sentative Bob Goodlatte of Virginia continues as Chair-
man of the House Committee on Agriculture. Republican
Senator Saxby Chambliss of Georgia is the new Chairman
of the Senate Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition, and
Forestry. He succeeds Senator Thad Cochran of Missis-
sippi, who is the new Chairman of the full Senate Com-
mittee on Appropriations. Democratic Representative
Collin Peterson of Minnesota is the new Ranking Member
(senior minority party member) of the House Committee.
He succeeds Representative Charlie Stenholm of Texas,
who was defeated for re-election. Democratic Senator
Tom Harkin of Iowa continues as the Ranking Member of
the Senate Committee.
Budget. Concerns over continuing federal budget deficits
could lead to “budget reconciliation” in 2005. If budget
reconciliation were to occur, most, if not all, authorizing
committees would be required to “share the pain” of
reducing the deficit in a coordinated fashion by developing
legislation to reduce spending on their mandatory pro-
grams. (Mandatory spending is spending other than
through annual appropriations). For the Agriculture Com-
mittees, mandatory spending programs include food
stamps and other nutrition, commodity, conservation,
crop insurance, selected research, export, forestry, trans-
portation, and rural development programs.
Livestock Issues. The committees will provide input and
oversight on a number of livestock issues including the fol-
lowing: the US BSE surveillance program, BSE and beef
trade with Canada; BSE and beef trade with Japan; a
national animal identification system; country-of-origin
labeling; and reauthorizing mandatory price reporting
(authority expires in September, 2005).
Trade Issues. The committees will provide input and over-
sight on a number of trade issues including the following:
BSE and beef trade with Canada; BSE and beef trade with
Japan and other countries in Asia; the Doha Round nego-
tiations in the WTO; a number of bilateral and subre-
gional negotiations on trade agreements, including those
with Thailand, Panama, three Andean countries, and
selected Middle East countries; the Central America Free
Trade Agreement; and the US-Brazil WTO cotton case (a
WTO decision on the US appeal is expected in early
March).
Futures Markets. The committees will be reauthorizing the
Commodity Futures Trading Commission, the indepen-
dent federal agency that oversees the trading of futures
contracts in the United States in accordance with the
Commodity Exchange Act. As part of the reauthorization
process, the committees will consider whether changes to
the CEA are needed to improve market oversight.
Farm Bill Hearings. The House will start preliminary hear-
ings on the next farm bill. (The current farm bill expires in
2007). Hearings will be held both in Washington, DC,
and around the country.
Washington Scene: On the Hill
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Country-of-Origin Labeling and the Beef 
Industry
David P. Anderson and Oral Capps, Jr.
Country-of-origin labeling (COOL) was probably the
most contentious issue to come out of the 2002 farm bill.
This issue of Choices features COOL as one thematic con-
tribution. Some agricultural and consumer advocacy
groups, notably US cow-calf producer and fruit and vege-
table grower and shipper associations, have argued for leg-
islation that would require suppliers to provide consumers
with country-of-origin information about food products.
Opponents to COOL—in particular, US cattle feeder and
hog finishing operations, meat packers, processors, and
retailers, have countered that the costs of labeling, record-
keeping, and operating procedures would be extremely
burdensome. Congress amended the Agricultural Market-
ing Act of 1946 and mandated COOL for beef, lamb,
pork, poultry, fish, and other agricultural commodities as
part of the Farm Security and Rural Investment Act of
2002. Initially, according to this act, COOL was to be put
into operation by September 30, 2004. However, in
response to much criticism, Congress agreed to delay the
implementation of COOL until 2006. This delay applied
to meats, produce, and peanuts, but not to farm-raised
and wild-caught fish. Arguments over its implementation
and start-up dates continue at this time, keeping COOL a
hot issue.
Interestingly enough, the economic impacts of COOL
for the affected commodities had been studied very little,
if at all. There was no information on the benefits of
COOL; it was not clear whether consumers would pay a
premium for the information. It was assumed by propo-
nents that, of course, consumers were clamoring for that
information and would pay more for it. There were no
estimates of COOL costs, but costs are heavily dependent
on implementation requirements, which were not known
until the USDA released a final rule. Cost estimates that
surfaced after the farm bill was passed depended on
assumptions about how to interpret the law. COOL may
be a good example of supporting and passing a law that
sounded good at the time without really knowing what the
benefits and costs were going to be. Given the continued
controversy surrounding COOL, this issue of Choices pulls
together current research on costs, benefits, demand shifts,
willingness-to-pay (WTP) issues, and a look ahead at
potential industry changes. 
In this issue of Choices, we examine who will bear the
costs of COOL in the beef, pork, and poultry sectors; the
demand shifts needed for those engaged in the beef indus-
try to be no worse off under COOL; the premium, if any,
consumers are willing to pay for COOL-labeled meat; and
the potential impact of COOL on the vertical coordina-
tion/vertical integration strategies in the beef industry.
Emphasis is placed on the impacts of COOL associated
with the beef industry. Contributors to this theme are
Gary Brester, John Marsh, Joseph Atwood, John Ander-
son, Wendy Umberger, Ernie Davis, Dan Hanselka, David
Anderson, and Oral Capps, Jr., respectively. We also wish
to recognize the following reviewers whose comments
greatly improved the content and readability of each of the
papers: Dillon M. Feuz, Chris Bastian, Janet Perry, Clem
Ward, Ted Schroeder, and John VanSickle. Any remaining
omissions or errors are the sole responsibility of the con-
tributors and editors.
Articles in this Theme:
Who Will Bear the Costs of Country-of-Origin 
Labeling? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Demand Shifts in Beef Associated with 
Country-of-Origin Labeling to Minimize 
Losses in Social Welfare. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Will Consumers Pay a Premium for Country-of-
Origin Labeled Meat? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
Potential Impact of Country-of-Origin 
Labeling on Beef Industry Structure  . . . . . 21
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Who Will Bear the Costs of
Country-of-Origin Labeling?
Gary W. Brester, John M. Marsh, and Joseph Atwood
Several studies have attempted to quantify the expected
costs of COOL (Davis, 2003; Hayes & Meyer, 2003).
Annual cost estimates for the beef industry range from
$200 million to $6.4 billion and from $20 million to $1
billion for the pork industry. Proponents of COOL argue
that most of the larger cost estimates are overstated. They
also emphasize results of experimental auctions and sur-
veys that suggest some consumers may be willing to pay a
premium for beef that has been labeled by country-of-ori-
gin. Conversely, others argue that although some consum-
ers may be willing to pay for country-of-origin labeling,
they may not have to pay for any of it, given that the
majority of beef and pork products are of domestic origin
(Plain & Grimes, 2003). Thus, imported meat products
could sell at a discount rather than domestic products
commanding a premium. In addition, the US Department
of Agriculture (AMS, 2003) found “little evidence that
consumers are willing to pay a price premium for country-
of-origin labeling” (p. 50) and that “estimated benefits
associated with this rule are likely to be negligible” (p. 49).
Meat suppliers, retailers, and restaurants can voluntar-
ily choose to label meat products by country of origin.
Because such activity currently occurs only on a small
scale, one might argue that market evidence indicates the
costs of country-of-origin labeling exceed the benefits.
However, one also could argue that voluntary country-of-
origin labeling does not occur because benefits and costs of
labeling may accrue at different levels in the marketing
channel. Furthermore, if consumers do not trust the accu-
racy of voluntary labels, then adverse selection occurs as a
result of asymmetric information. Thus, country-of-origin
labeling benefits may only accrue if labeling is mandatory.
In the beef and pork industries, market forces cause
increases in marketing and processing costs to be distrib-
uted across market levels. Thus, the incidence of COOL
costs depends primarily on relative demand and supply
elasticities at each level of the marketing chain. Further-
more, changes in the well-being of producers and consum-
ers are best estimated by considering changes in producer
and consumer surplus.
This article reports estimates of short- and long-run
changes in market prices and quantities of meat and live-
stock in the beef, pork, and poultry sectors that would
result from the implementation of COOL. We develop a
type of economic model that incorporates estimated
COOL costs, accounts for interrelationships along the
marketing chain for each meat sector, and allows for sub-
stitutability among meat products at the consumer level.
The model is used to simulate price and quantity adjust-
ments to COOL cost shocks and the impact of potential
demand increases that might be induced by COOL. In
addition, we estimate cumulative changes in producer wel-
fare at each level of the marketing chain and consumer
welfare at the retail level to determine the effects of COOL
on consumers and livestock and meat producers.
Evolution of Country-Of-Origin Labeling
Country-of-origin labeling is mandated for most products
imported by the United States under section 304 of the
1930 Tariff Act. However, several agricultural products,
including livestock (but not processed livestock products)
and several “natural” products (e.g., some fruits, nuts, and
vegetables) are included on a “J” list of commodities
exempt from existing US country-of-origin labeling
requirements. Country-of-origin exempt products are gen-
erally combined with similar domestic products during
processing and marketing (e.g., domestic and imported
beef carcasses). For nonexempt products, current country-
of-origin labeling legislation requires listing the source
(country) of imported products through the marketing
system until purchased by a final consumer.
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The 2002 Food Security and
Rural Investment Act added a new
subtitle (Subtitle D—Country of
Origin Labeling) to the Agricultural
Marketing Act of 1946. The subtitle
mandated voluntary COOL on Sep-
tember 30, 2002 and mandatory
COOL by September 30, 2004.
Unprocessed fresh, frozen, and
ground beef and pork will be
required to be labeled by country of
origin, but poultry products, delica-
tessen food items, processed foods,
restaurants, food services, and small
retailers (those with less than
$230,000 of annual sales) will remain
exempt. Recently, Congress approved
a two-year delay for COOL imple-
mentation.
Background on US Meat and 
Livestock Imports
The United States imports feeder cat-
tle from Mexico (which are subse-
quently finished in US feedlots),
trimmings and ground beef from
Australia and New Zealand, and a
mix of high-value muscle cuts, man-
ufacturing/trimming beef, fed and
cull slaughter cattle, and cattle car-
casses from Canada. Over 75% of
slaughter cattle imports have been
grain-fed. Imported beef is inspected
and must meet food safety standards
equivalent to that for domestically-
produced beef products. Beef
imported as live fed cattle or as car-
casses is eligible for US Department
of Agriculture quality grades. In
2002, beef imports from all sources
represented 16.9% of total US beef
supplies. In 2002, 51% of all beef
imports were trimming and manu-
facturing grade beef which is subse-
quently ground into hamburger. Live
cattle imports (on a carcass weight
basis) from Canada represented
approximately 28% of US beef
imports in 2002.
In 2002, the United States
imported approximately 1.1 billion
pounds of pork, which represented
about 5.2% of total US pork sup-
plies. Over 80% of these imports
originated in Canada. In addition,
the United States imported 5.7 mil-
lion head of hogs and feeder pigs,
which represents about 5.7% of US
hog slaughter. Almost all hog imports
originated in Canada. 
The US poultry industry is the
world’s largest producer and exporter
of poultry meat. In 2002, US poultry
meat (broilers, other chicken, and
turkey) exports were about 14.5% of
domestic poultry supplies. In 2002,
imports amounted to 16 million
pounds, or less than 0.5% of domes-
tic production. US consumption of
poultry meat (broilers, other chicken,
and turkey) is considerably higher
than either beef or pork consump-
tion, but less than total red meat con-
sumption. However, the United
States imports only small amounts of
poultry products.
Modeling Strategy
An economic displacement model
was developed assuming that COOL
imposes additional marketing costs
on suppliers at each market level (for
a complete discussion of the model,
see Brester, Marsh, & Atwood,
2004). The model is based on supply
and demand relationships in the beef,
pork, and poultry industries using
actual quantities produced and sup-
ply and demand elasticities. These
costs are generated by increased com-
modity segregation, record keeping,
verification, labeling, and certifica-
tion. The beef marketing chain con-
sists of four distinct sectors: retail
(consumer), wholesale (processor),
slaughter (cattle feeding), and farm
(feeder cattle). The pork marketing
chain is more integrated than the
beef sector; therefore, we consider
demand and supply relations for only
three sectors: retail, wholesale, and
slaughter (hog feeding). The poultry
sector is highly integrated so only the
retail and wholesale sectors are con-
sidered.
Estimates of COOL Costs
The costs of COOL costs at each
level of the beef and pork industries
were obtained from Sparks Compa-
nies (2003). Although these estimates
are smaller than those suggested by
Davis (2003) and larger than those
suggested by Vansickle et al. (2003),
they are similar to recent USDA esti-
mates. Sparks Companies estimate
that COOL will result in a $1.653
billion annual increase in operating
costs to the beef industry. Further-
more, they estimate that these cost
increases would be distributed as
$805 million to the retail sector,
$500 million to the packer (whole-
sale) sector, $150 million to the feed-
lot (fed cattle) sector, and $198
million to the cow/calf (feeder cattle)
sector. Using 2002 average prices and
quantities for each market level, these
costs estimates represent the follow-
ing percentage increases in costs rela-
tive to total value: 1.24% at the retail
level, 1.71% at the wholesale level,
0.50% at the fed cattle level, and
0.96% at the feeder cattle level.
Sparks Companies estimate that
COOL will generate $713 million of
additional costs for the pork industry,
with $263 million occurring at the
retail level, $350 million at the
wholesale level, and $100 million at
the hog finishing level. Based on
2002 average prices and quantities,
these cost increases represent the fol-
lowing percentage increases relative
to total value at each level: 0.66% at
the retail level, 3.41% at the whole-
sale level, and 1.08% at the hog fin-
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ishing level. These percentage
increases generate vertical shifts of
their respective supply functions.
Currently, poultry is exempt from
COOL legislation. Therefore, we
assume that no additional costs are
incurred by the poultry industry as a
result of COOL.
Simulation Results
Price and Quantity Effects of COOL 
Assuming No Change in Consumer 
Demand
We initially simulate short- and long-
run impacts of the above percentage
cost changes assuming that COOL
has no effects on consumer demand
for beef and pork. Beef, pork, and
poultry prices increase at the retail
and wholesale levels, and feeder cattle
prices increase at the farm level, but
all beef and pork quantities decline.
These results are theoretically consis-
tent, because additional marketing
costs increase farm-retail price
spreads. Poultry prices and quanti-
ties increase because poultry demand
increases as consumers substitute
away from relatively more expensive
beef and pork products.
Economic studies often include
impacts stated in terms of economic
welfare or producer and consumer
surplus. Consumer surplus simply
means the benefits consumers get
from a product over what they paid
for it. Similarly, producer surplus is
the revenue producers receive over
their production costs. 
In the absence of demand
increases, producer surplus declines
at all levels of the beef and pork
industries; beef and pork producers
are clearly worse off, economically,
without a demand increase to pay for
the costs of compliance. Increased
poultry demand generates increases
in producer surplus at every level of
the poultry industry. Across all meat
sectors, retail level consumer surplus
declines.
It is appropriate to consider
cumulative changes in producer sur-
plus as an industry adjusts from a
short-run to a long-run equilib-
rium.  To simulate these cumulative
effects, we assume that it takes 10
years (the average length of a cattle
cycle) to adjust from the short run to
the long run in the meat industry.
We report the present value of these
changes in producer and consumer
surplus assuming a 5% discount rate.
Over the 10-year adjustment period,
producer surplus declines at every
market level of the beef and pork
industries. In addition, retail level
consumer surplus declines in both
the beef and pork industries.
Although the poultry industry gains
producer surplus and retail-level con-
sumer surplus, the entire meat indus-
try loses producer surplus and retail-
level consumer surplus if COOL
does not increase consumer demand
for beef and pork.
Price and Quantity Effects of COOL 
Resulting From Changes in Consumer 
Demand
A second simulation was conducted
to determine the COOL-induced
beef and pork demand increases
required so that farm-level cattle and
hog producers do not lose cumulative
(present value) producer surplus over
the 10-year adjustment period. The
model predicts that one-time perma-
nent increases of 4.05% in beef
demand and 4.45% in pork demand
would be necessary for the present
value of gains and losses in the feeder
cattle and hog production sectors to
be zero. Most livestock prices increase
in the short run, and all prices and
quantities increase in the long run.
A Discussion of the Simulation 
Results
The above simulation results are con-
tingent upon our selection of COOL
costs for each market level of the beef
and pork industries. Overall, the
price, quantity, and producer surplus
changes in the livestock industries are
relatively small; however, COOL-
induced marketing costs also are
small relative to revenues generated at
each market level.  Furthermore, if
actual COOL costs are smaller or
larger than those used in this simula-
tion, the estimates of price, quantity,
and producer and consumer surplus
changes will be proportionally
smaller or larger. The critical point of
our research is that livestock produc-
ers lose producer surplus if the imple-
mentation of COOL fails to increase
consumer demand for domestically-
produced beef and pork products. If
one-time permanent demand
increases do occur, they need to
exceed 4.05% for beef and 4.45% for
pork if the lowest levels of the beef
and pork production sectors (feeder
cattle and hog producers) are to be
no worse off in the long run.
It should be noted that COOL
applies only to beef and pork muscle
cuts and ground products sold
through grocery stores.  Approxi-
mately 52% of beef volume is sold
through retail outlets. Therefore, an
industry-wide 4.05% increase in beef
demand would have to be generated
by approximately one half of the beef
market.
Concluding Comments
If COOL-induced demand increases
do not occur, then all sectors of the
beef and pork industries lose pro-
ducer surplus. In addition, retail beef
and pork consumers lose consumer
surplus. To determine the ultimate
effects of COOL on producer and
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retail level consumer surplus, the dis-
counted present value of cumulative
effects of producer and consumer
surplus gains and losses should be
calculated over a sufficiently long
period to allow for gradual change in
livestock and meat supplies. Retail
beef and pork demand would have to
experience one-time permanent
increases of 4.05% and 4.45%,
respectively, if feeder cattle and hog
producers were to be no worse off
than before COOL. Because COOL
applies only to beef and pork muscle
cuts and ground products sold
through retail outlets, this sector of
the beef and pork industries must
generate the entire demand increase.
These results are, of course, specific
to our assumptions regarding the size
and distribution of marketing costs
resulting from the implementation of
COOL.
The poultry industry is the only
unequivocal winner of the imple-
mentation of COOL. We assumed
that the poultry industry’s cost struc-
ture was unaffected by COOL
because poultry is currently excluded
from COOL legislation. Conse-
quently, increased COOL marketing
costs in the beef and pork sectors that
increase retail beef and pork prices
encourage consumers to substitute
towards poultry products. This
demand increase causes subsequent
increases in poultry prices, quantities,
and producer and consumer surplus
in the poultry industry.
COOL is receiving a chilly recep-
tion by some market participants pri-
marily because of the uncertainty
regarding potential increases in
demand and costs resulting from the
legislation. It is interesting to note
that the most vocal proponents of
COOL have been groups primarily
representing feeder cattle producers.
The strong support of COOL pro-
vided by some feeder cattle producers
indicates that those producers expect
COOL-induced beef demand
increases to more than offset addi-
tional marketing costs. They may be
unaware that the incidence of both
COOL costs and benefits will largely
be determined by relative supply and
demand elasticities among meat
industries and market levels.
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Demand Shifts in Beef Associated with 
Country-of-Origin Labeling to Minimize 
Losses in Social Welfare
Daniel D. Hanselka, Ernest E. Davis, David P. Anderson, and Oral Capps, Jr.
A primary concern of the COOL program are the costs
incurred by retail chain stores and distributors, meat pack-
ers and processors, and others in the supply chain. Since
the release of the mandatory COOL program in the 2002
Farm Security and Rural Investment Act, a number of
individuals and organizations have put forth estimates of
the additional costs associated with the implementation of
the mandatory COOL program. The various studies per-
taining to the implementation and compliance of COOL
have a broad range of cost estimates for numerous covered
commodities. This article provides a cost assessment,
based on survey results, for implementing COOL regula-
tions for the beef industry, and an estimate of the change
in demand for retail beef, wholesale beef, fed cattle, and
feeder cattle needed to negate the increase in costs of
implementing mandatory COOL. 
The literature indicates that estimates of the costs to
the beef industry range from $200 million to $5.9 billion
dollars, although the upper estimate appears to be unduly
large (see Hanselka, 2004, for details). But, in arriving at
these cost figures, none of the studies used an in-depth,
structured survey methodology of industry participants.
This research collected financial and production data and
information from surveys of prepared questions adminis-
tered to various industry representatives in order to deter-
mine estimates of incremental COOL costs to the beef
industry. The surveys were developed to collect actual
company cost estimates and production data that would
result from the implementation and compliance of
COOL. Additional company costs regarding COOL
implementation included both incremental and capital
costs associated with identification, segregation, preserva-
tion, management, operational, labeling, labor, and other
compliance and enforcement costs. The survey included
questions about identification and distribution changes
that could occur as a result of the implementation of
COOL, such as segregated production lines by origin or
elimination of foreign origin beef processing.
Surveys were sent to the top 30 US cattle feeders and
beef packers, as identified by Cattle Buyer’s Weekly, an
industry newsletter. The 75 largest grocery retailers, as
identified by industry newsletters, also were surveyed. The
surveys were sent out by registered mail to company offi-
cials identified as having operational knowledge of compli-
ance costs. Follow-up calls were made to ask for help with
the research, and additional survey copies were provided.
Response rates were 50% for the stocker and feedlot oper-
ators, 30% for packers, and 11% for retailers.
The questions were developed by economists specializ-
ing in livestock and meat economics and meat scientists
specializing in meat processing. The survey questions were
pretested with several industry participants; adjustments
were made to the questions based on their responses in
order to make the survey more useable and answerable.
The retail chain store and distributor level costs for the
beef supply chain were estimated to be approximately
$0.08 per pound of beef sold to reconfigure their meat
departments to maintain product identity, to maintain
required record-keeping at individual stores, and to place
COOL labels on beef items in the meat case. An estimated
$16.99 per head was calculated for meat packers and pro-
cessors to reconfigure their slaughter and fabrication
departments to maintain segregation and identity of cattle
into boxed beef. Costs for the cattle feedlot segment are
estimated at $12.94 per head for feeding segregation, data
storage, and costs associated with tracking cattle. Finally, it
is estimated that the additional costs of implementing
COOL for cow-calf operators, cattle backgrounders, and
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cattle stockers were about $3.89 per
head for identifying the movement of
cattle and starting the passport trans-
actions up to delivery of the animal
to finishing. These were calculated as
weighted averages, by volume, of the
survey respondents. 
Importantly, the cost estimates at
each level of the marketing channel
varied noticeably by firm. This varia-
tion is due, in part, to the specific
management and production prac-
tices of the company and whether
that particular company handles only
foreign beef products or cattle, only
domestic beef products or cattle, or a
combination of foreign and domestic
beef products.
We apply the estimated costs to
actual beef industry production levels
in 2003 in order to estimate the total
costs incurred at each level of the
supply chain in the beef industry.
Using consumption figures of 18.9
billion pounds (retail weight) of beef
in 2003 and assuming 52% was sold
at retail, total incremental costs of the
mandatory COOL program accruing
to retail chain stores and distributors
amounted to $818 million. For meat
packers and processors, given that
35.5 million head of cattle were
slaughtered in 2003, total additional
costs added to the meat packing sec-
tor amounted to $603 million. Based
on 27.6 million head of fed cattle
marketed in 2003, total costs to the
cattle feeding sector was estimated to
be $356 million. Feedlot placements
totaled 24.9 million head of calves in
2003, yielding an estimated total
incremental cost of $97 million to
the cow-calf producer, cattle back-
grounder, and cattle stocker segments
of the beef industry. For the beef
industry as a whole, then, the esti-
mated additional annual costs to sat-
isfy COOL requirements would total
$1.9 billion using 2003 production
levels. These cost estimates are com-
parable to those reported in the liter-
ature, albeit falling at the upper end
of the spectrum.
Aside from estimating the incre-
mental and capital costs accruing to
each market level of the beef indus-
try, this research also examined the
changes in market demand, price,
and overall economic welfare effects
of COOL on all participants of the
beef industry. Several studies have
been conducted examining the mar-
ket, social welfare, and revenue
effects of COOL on the beef, pork,
and poultry industries. Unlike previ-
ous studies, this research estimates
the magnitude of increases in the
demand for retail beef, wholesale
beef, fed cattle, and feeder cattle
needed to offset or negate the
induced costs of COOL so that pro-
ducers and consumers would be no
worse off from an economic welfare
standpoint. Economic welfare simply
means the value consumers get from
the product over what they paid for it
and the revenue producers get from a
product over the costs of producing
it.
In order to estimate the necessary
demand shifts, a model was devel-
oped using elasticity estimates previ-
ously published in the literature, as
well as actual livestock and beef num-
bers. The changes in demand and
prices are calculated to estimate the
amount needed to offset the esti-
mated incremental costs of COOL to
leave the quantity moved through the
supply chain and the welfare of those
engaged in the beef marketing chan-
nel unchanged. The purpose for
holding the original quantity con-
stant is to determine the magnitude
of the demand shift necessary at each
marketing level to offset the increased
COOL costs. By holding quantity
constant, volumes are held constant
in each production sector. 
Livestock and beef quantities
from 2003, elasticities of supply and
demand supplied by Brester, et al.,
and the COOL compliance costs
developed in the survey reported
above were used to estimate the
change in beef demand necessary to
make producers and consumers just
as well off. The model was solved
using an Excel spreadsheet. The
advantage of using a spreadsheet is
that it allows for sensitivity analysis
given varying assumptions on elastic-
ities, quantities, and costs.  This type
of sensitivity analysis then could be
performed using other estimates of
costs, elasticities, and quantities for
other years.
The results indicate that an
increase of 1.2% in beef demand
would be necessary for the welfare
gains and losses in the retail sector to
be zero. An increase in wholesale
demand for carcasses of 0.8% would
be necessary for the producers and
consumers in the wholesale produc-
tion sector to be no worse off eco-
nomically. Finally, for fed cattle and
feeder cattle markets, the results indi-
cate that increases of 0.56% and
0.24% in demand for fed and feeder
cattle, respectively, are necessary to
leave welfare effects unchanged. 
With this demand shift, retail
beef price is estimated to increase by
2.4%. Similar to the retail market,
the wholesale beef price is estimated
to increase by 1.8%. Fed cattle price
is estimated to increase by 1.4% and
feeder cattle price to increase by
0.6%.
Whether the economic costs of
COOL can be recovered ultimately
depends on two factors: (a) the level
of marketing and production costs
that accrue at all marketing levels of
the industry, and (b) the increase in
demand at the various marketing lev-
els needed to offset the costs of
COOL. Based on this research, the
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beef industry costs associated with
the mandatory program appear to be
large, totaling about $1.9 billion. It
would appear, however, that rather
moderate shifts in demand at each
level of the marketing channel are
necessary to offset implementation
costs, holding quantities constant. In
any large industry like the beef indus-
try, seemingly small shifts in demand
can translate into large shifts in reve-
nue. In this case, these results indi-
cate that a 1.2% increase in beef
demand at the retail level would off-
set COOL costs. The necessary
demand shift is smaller in this work
compared to others in the literature
because we look at beef alone, and we
hold quantity constant. There is no
interaction with pork and poultry
where market share has to be recap-
tured. Holding quantity constant
allows beef industry participants to
maintain volumes produced. Given
apparent increasing demand for beef
in recent years, perhaps a one percent
increase in demand at the retail level
is possible. If so, then the implemen-
tation of COOL may not negatively
impact those engaged in the beef
industry along the marketing chan-
nel.
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Will Consumers Pay a Premium for
Country-of-Origin Labeled Meat?
Wendy J. Umberger
Proponents of mandatory country-of-origin labeling
(COOL) of meat argue that COOL would provide US
producers with a competitive advantage in the market-
place. They contend that US consumers perceive domestic
meat products to be higher quality than imported meat
products. Therefore, because of its higher perceived qual-
ity, U.S.-labeled meat will garner a premium over
imported meat. Advocates of mandatory COOL draw on
the results of several recent academic studies to attest that
US consumers support and are willing to pay for certified
US products. Are the COOL advocates’ assumptions
regarding the higher perceived quality of US meat and
subsequent premiums justified? 
Is there Evidence to Support Premiums for Country-
of-Origin Labeling of Meat?
Recent studies of US consumers and meat marketers have
sought to determine if support exists for a mandatory
country-of-origin labeling program for meat sold in the
United States. In general, the studies find support for a
mandatory country-of-origin labeling program and poten-
tial premiums for “Certified U.S.” meat products. For
example, 93% of Louisiana consumers surveyed supported
mandatory COOL of fresh and frozen beef (Schupp &
Gillespie, 2001a). The majority of Louisiana meat han-
dlers surveyed also favored a mandatory COOL program;
they were particularly supportive if they believed their cus-
tomers would find the label valuable (Schupp & Gillespie,
2001b). 
Three separate studies explore whether US consumers
would value COOL by assessing whether consumers
would be willing to pay a premium for “Certified U.S.”
meat. The first willingness-to-pay (WTP) study surveyed
243 Colorado consumers at supermarkets during spring
2002. Colorado consumers indicated that they were will-
ing to pay an average of 38% and 58% more to obtain
“Certified U.S.” steak and hamburger, respectively
(Loureiro & Umberger, 2003). Additionally, the same set
of Colorado consumers were asked to indicate their sup-
port for a mandatory COOL program, provided it would
cost their household a specified amount. Consumers were
willing to pay an average of $184 per household for a
mandatory COOL program.
The second WTP study on COOL, conducted in Chi-
cago and Denver during summer 2002, used survey proce-
dures and experimental auction methods to determine
premiums for COOL (Umberger et al., 2003). In this
study, 73% of the consumers surveyed indicated they
would be willing to pay average premiums of 11% and
24% for COOL of steak and hamburger, respectively.
However, after participating in an experimental auction,
only 69% of the same consumers were willing to pay an
average premium of 19% for a “U.S.A. Guaranteed” steak
over an unlabeled, generic steak. Consumers expressed the
following reasons for preferring US guaranteed beef over
imported beef: food safety concerns regarding imported
meat, a fear of meat from specific countries that had out-
breaks of Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE, or
Mad Cow Disease), a preference for the general informa-
tion provided by the label, a desire to support US produc-
ers, and a belief that the quality of meat from specific
countries was better.
The third and most expansive WTP study was con-
ducted in spring 2003 and surveyed households through-
out the continental United States via mail. The contingent
valuation methods employed in this study were similar to
those of Loureiro and Umberger (2003); however, premi-
ums for “Certified U.S.” labeling of three different meat
products were compared: beef steaks, pork chops, and
chicken breasts. The continental US consumers surveyed
were only willing to pay average premiums of 2.5–2.9%
over the original market price to obtain “Certified U.S.”
chicken breasts, pork chops, and ribeye steaks (Loureiro &
Umberger, in press).
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Would These Premiums Actually 
Exist at the Supermarket?
As mentioned previously, some pro-
ponents of COOL interpret the
results of these WTP studies to be
evidence that premiums would exist
at the supermarket for US meat
products. Before reaching that con-
clusion, a number of other factors
must be considered. All of the WTP
studies utilized common contingent
valuation or experimental auction
methods, which have been shown to
be very useful for determining values
for both nonmarket and market
goods. However, as with any contin-
gent valuation or experimental
research, the results obtained from
these studies are estimates of poten-
tial values and are dependent upon
both the methods used (research
design) and the sample of the popu-
lation studied. The potential for dif-
ferences in WTP estimates due to
elicitation method used is evident by
the wide distribution of premiums
across studies. The size of premiums
for “Certified U.S.” or “Guaranteed
U.S.” meat products decrease as a
larger sample of the population is
surveyed. The premiums elicited
from the more expansive Chicago
and Denver sample (Umberger et al.,
2003) and the continental US sample
(Loureiro & Umberger, in press) are
much lower than the premiums
obtained from the regional Colorado
study (Loureiro & Umberger, 2003).
It is also important to note that
the labels and certification methods
used to elicit WTP values in the
studies mentioned above are likely
different than those that would be
used in the mandatory COOL pro-
gram. The WTP studies essentially
compare a US product to an unla-
beled or generic beef product. The
2002 Farm Bill’s COOL provision
explicitly states that only animals
born, raised, and slaughtered or pro-
cessed in the United States can qual-
ify for a US country-of-origin label
(USDA AMS 2002). Under the cur-
rent AMS COOL guidelines
(released in October 2003), imported
beef products from cattle produced
entirely (born, raised, and processed)
in any country other than the United
States would be labeled as “Imported
from Country X.” However,
“blended-origin” meat products such
as hamburger, which may contain
meat products from multiple coun-
tries, would contain a label indicating
in alphabetical order the different
countries of origin of the meat. Addi-
tionally, under these 2003 labeling
guidelines, meat produced from
“mixed-origin” animals, such as
feeder calves imported into the
United States from a country such as
Mexico and finished in a US feedlot,
would be labeled as “From Animals
Born in Mexico, Raised and Pro-
cessed in the U.S.A.” (USDA AMS
2003).
Therefore, under a mandatory
COOL program, all fresh meat prod-
ucts sold at a supermarket would
carry some kind of country-of-origin
label. At the retail level, US beef
products could potentially be mar-
keted next to beef products from
countries such as Canada, Australia,
New Zealand, Mexico, and South
American countries. How would the
perceived quality of US meat com-
pare to meat imported from other
countries? Would consumers choose
a US product over an imported one?
In order to answer this question, it is
important to understand the factors
influencing the perceived quality of
meat.
What Determines Consumers’ 
Perceptions of Meat Quality?
Quality is a rather ambiguous term,
meaning different things to different
people depending upon their prefer-
ences for the various attributes of a
product. Consumers tend to use
multiple attributes to evaluate the
quality of, and subsequently deter-
mine their preference for, one food
product over another. When evaluat-
ing food product quality, consumers
use both intrinsic and extrinsic quality
cues. Intrinsic cues are attributes
inherent to the product that cannot
be changed without changing the
physical properties of the product.
Extrinsic cues are attributes only
related to the physical product. Prod-
uct attributes are typically further
categorized as search, experience, or
credence attributes. Search attributes
are quality attributes that can be eval-
uated by the consumer at the point of
purchase and prior to consumption.
For meat products, color, leanness,
and marbling (intramuscular fat) are
intrinsic search characteristics. Exam-
ples of extrinsic search characteristics
include brand name, price, and
country of origin (Grunert).
Experience attributes are observ-
able during or following consump-
tion and include the eating quality
(texture, juiciness, flavor, and smell)
of a meat product as well as food
safety (e.g., whether there is an
adverse effect immediately following
consumption). Credence attributes
are quality attributes that the con-
sumer may value but cannot discern
when purchasing a product or even
after normal use. Process and produc-
tion attributes, such as country of
origin, organic, animal welfare, envi-
ronmentally friendly, and free-range,
are examples of credence attributes.
Credible and auditable labeling sys-
tems are necessary for verification of
credence attributes. 
Research on consumers’ per-
ceived meat quality suggests that con-
sumers use a multitude of intrinsic
and extrinsic search attributes as well
as experience and credence attributes
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to determine the quality of a product.
The relative importance of different
types of attributes to consumers dif-
fers depending on sociodemographic
characteristics and the location of
consumers. For example, various seg-
ments of the population prefer and
are willing to pay more for COOL
than others, and the importance of
country of origin in a consumer’s
assessment of perceived value has
been shown to differ depending upon
the particular country where the
study was conducted (Davidson,
Schroder, & Bower; Grunert).
Therefore, given the multitude of
factors which consumers may use to
assess a product’s quality, the premi-
ums for COOL and “Certified U.S.”
meat over unbranded products may
be inflated, because consumers were
specifically asked to focus only on the
country-of-origin attribute rather
than on other meat quality attributes,
which may be equally (or more)
important to consumers. For exam-
ple, in the contingent valuation stud-
ies, consumers were not able to use
other extrinsic cues (such as price,
brand, and USDA grade) or any
intrinsic cues (such as color or mar-
bling) to determine the value of the
products.
In evaluating the ability of the
premiums elicited in the WTP stud-
ies to be good predictors of premi-
ums that might be obtained in the
actual marketplace, one should also
consider the importance of country
of origin and source assurance rela-
tive to other experience and search
attributes. In each of the three con-
sumer WTP studies, consumers were
asked to rate, in terms of importance
in their meat purchasing decision, a
series of meat product attributes
commonly used as meat quality cues.
Food safety inspection and freshness
were rated as the two most important
beef quality attributes in all three
studies. Other attributes, such as
leanness, color, tenderness assurance,
quality grade, and price, generally
received higher average ratings than
country of origin or source assurance
(Loureiro & Umberger, 2003, in
press; Umberger et al., 2003).
The results of the aggregate
attribute rankings indicate that
although some consumers indicate
they are willing to pay a premium for
the source assurance provided by
country-of-origin labels, the premi-
ums would only exist if US beef were
perceived to be safer and of higher
quality (in terms of non-safety-
related meat quality attributes) than
beef from other countries. According
to the results of a national survey,
80% of the 819 US consumers sur-
veyed believed that food produced or
raised in the United States is fresher
and safer than food imported from
global food sources (Wimberley et
al.). Results from the continental US
consumer study conducted by
Loureiro and Umberger (in press)
also indicate that US meat is per-
ceived to be the safest relative to meat
from Argentina, Australia, Canada,
Denmark, Mexico, and New
Zealand. Nonetheless, meat from
Canada, Australia, and New Zealand
still received an average rating of
“safe,” but meat produced in Mexico
and Argentina was not rated as safe.1
In terms of other quality
attributes, US meat initially may be
perceived to be of higher quality than
imported meat. However, some con-
sumers may actually prefer meat
from other countries, particularly
after experiencing it and being pro-
vided with additional labeling infor-
mation on specific process- and
production-related credence
attributes. Consider, for example, a
beef product labeled as “Certified US
corn-fed beef ” marketed next to a
product labeled as “Certified Austra-
lian grass-fed beef.” If given the
choice, what product would consum-
ers prefer and which one would they
potentially pay a premium for?
In blind taste tests, 23%, 17%,
and 34% of consumers studied pre-
ferred the flavor of, and were willing
to pay a premium for, Argentine,
Australian, and Canadian beef,
respectively, relative to US beef
(Umberger et al., 2002; Sitz et al.).
The Australian and Argentine beef
products used in the taste panel stud-
ies were from grass-fed cattle. Most
of the beef imported into the United
States from these countries is grass-
fed, whereas US beef is typically
corn-fed. In addition to the flavor
attribute, some consumers perceive
grass-fed beef to be of higher quality
in terms of nutritional content. Con-
sequently, if US consumers view Aus-
tralian beef to be comparable to US
beef in terms of food safety, then
consumers who prefer the perceived
nutritional benefits and/or taste
attributes of grass-fed beef relative to
corn-fed beef may consider a US beef
product to be lower quality than the
Australian product. If they also now
have the opportunity at the super-
market to choose between a US beef
product and an Australian product,
1. It is important to note that 
these surveys were conducted 
prior to the December 23, 
2003 case of BSE (Mad Cow 
Disease) in Washington State.  
A separate survey of 1,001 US 
consumers conducted in Janu-
ary 2004 determined that 
85% of those surveyed were 
knowledgeable of the December 
BSE case; however, the major-
ity of the knowledgeable con-
sumers indicated that their 
confidence in the US beef sup-
ply remained unchanged (Hall-
man, Schilling, & Turvey).
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then consumers who find the Austra-
lian beef to be of superior quality
may actually discount the US prod-
uct. 
Premiums Under a Voluntary vs. 
a Mandatory COOL Program
A final aspect of a mandatory COOL
program that must be considered
when determining if retail premiums
exist for U.S.-labeled meat products
is the market share of US meat prod-
ucts relative to the share of imported
meat products. Although the results
of the WTP studies suggest a poten-
tial premium for U.S.-labeled meat
products over unlabeled meat, the
premium only exists at the retail level
if the quantity of U.S.-labeled meat
supplied is less than the quantity
demanded. Given the current pro-
duction capabilities of US produc-
ers, the supply of “Certified U.S.”
meat under a mandatory COOL pro-
gram would exceed the quantity
demanded, and there would be no
premiums for “Certified U.S.” meat
products at the retail level. For
instance, in the case of COOL of
beef, about 89% of the supply of US
beef steaks and roasts would qualify
to be labeled as a product of the
United States (Plain & Grimes).
Therefore, if only 69% of the con-
sumers were willing to pay a pre-
mium for US beef (as indicated by
Umberger et al., 2003), premiums
for US beef would not exist.
Conversely, under a voluntary
program, not all retail meat would be
labeled with country-of-origin infor-
mation, and marketers of meat prod-
ucts would be more likely to receive a
premium for “Certified U.S.” prod-
ucts over a product with no country-
of-origin label. We do not mean to
imply that under a voluntary pro-
gram a premium would exist for
“Certified U.S.” meat, or that all con-
sumers would pay a premium for
“Certified U.S.” meat products. In
the WTP studies discussed previ-
ously, not all consumers were willing
to pay a premium for COOL. How-
ever, there were identifiable seg-
ments of consumers that indicated
they would be more likely to be will-
ing to pay a premium for “Certified
U.S.” products. These consumers
represent target markets where pre-
miums might exist for “Certified
U.S.” meat products (Loureiro &
Umberger, 2003, in press; Umberger
et al., 2003).
An additional and related con-
cern is consumers’ interpretation of
the COOL program. It appears that a
number of the consumers who pre-
ferred COOL in the consumer stud-
ies interpreted the program to
provide them with additional food
safety assurances and enough trace-
ability information to allow a meat
product to be completely traced back
to the farm of origin. Based on how
the provision was written in the 2002
Farm Bill, a mandatory COOL pro-
gram is no more than a food-labeling
program and would only allow iden-
tification of a meat product’s country
of origin by stage of production. On
the other hand, the guidelines for a
voluntary program could specify
complete traceback and possibly
other credence attributes, further
increasing consumers’ quality percep-
tions and possibly creating actual
market premiums. Voluntary COOL
marketing strategies would only be
successful if the labeled product met
the consumers’ expectations of higher
quality and safer meat. Thus, for
COOL to be a viable marketing
strategy, US meat suppliers would
have to continually work to maintain
consumers’ safety and quality percep-
tions.
Will consumers pay a premium
for COOL meat? Research results
indicate that although some consum-
ers indicate they are willing to pay a
premium for the source assurance
provided by country-of-origin labels,
the premiums would only exist if US
beef was perceived to be safer and of
higher quality (in terms of non-
safety-related meat quality attributes)
than beef from other countries. So, it
remains unclear whether or not pre-
miums would exist for COOL.
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Potential Impact of Country-of-Origin 
Labeling on Beef Industry Structure
John D. Anderson and Darren Hudson
Nothing about COOL has been particularly simple. In
fact, COOL provisions represented one of the most vigor-
ously debated elements of the 2002 Farm Bill. Nowhere
was the debate over COOL more contentious than within
the beef industry.
Among beef industry participants at all levels, argu-
ments over COOL scarcely abated (and probably intensi-
fied) after the Farm Bill was passed. Predictably, much of
the debate over COOL focused on how much it would
cost (and who would have to pay for it). Estimating the
costs of COOL became a virtual cottage industry—with
estimates varying dramatically depending on assumptions
related primarily to record keeping and traceability
requirements. A good deal of debate also centered on the
potential benefits of COOL in terms of increased con-
sumer demand for beef. Here, as with cost estimates, it was
very difficult to arrive at a consensus. In early 2004, due at
least in part to the ongoing debate related to COOL costs
and benefits, Congress added an amendment to the 2004
Appropriation Act that delayed mandatory COOL for an
additional two years on all covered products except for fish
and shellfish (for which mandatory COOL took effect as
scheduled on September 30, 2004).
The beef industry’s focus on COOL costs is under-
standable. The industry currently is ill equipped to pro-
vide the level of traceability that the USDA has
consistently indicated the labeling program will require.
Sorting out how much it will cost to make compliance
possible is very important. But it is also somewhat surpris-
ing that an industry which has in the past seemed almost
preoccupied with structural issues (e.g., packer concentra-
tion and captive supplies) has virtually ignored the poten-
tial market structure implications of COOL legislation.
One vital element of the COOL legislation (as it is
currently written) is that retailers are responsible not only
for making sure covered products are labeled, but also for
documenting that labels are accurate. This situation means
that information on country of origin will have to be com-
municated clearly along the supply chain. In the beef
industry, where the supply chain is rather long and com-
plex, with ownership of cattle often changing several times
along the way, this task may be a real challenge. One logi-
cal way to deal with that challenge is through contracting,
or perhaps other forms of coordination.
In this article, we discuss how country-of-origin label-
ing is likely to affect vertical coordination/vertical integra-
tion strategies in the beef industry. In so doing, we seek
not only to inform the debate over COOL, but also to
place COOL within the larger context of industrial orga-
nization issues that have been the focus of much scrutiny
in the beef industry over the past twenty years. Consider-
ing COOL in this larger context may lead to a different
policy outcome than from a myopic focus on the costs
and/or benefits of this (or any other) individual program.
Vertical Coordination in the Cattle Industry
The issue of vertical coordination in the cattle industry has
been the subject of intense debate for many years. The pri-
mary focus of this debate has been on the use of market
power and “captive supplies” and their effect on cash mar-
ket prices. The USDA Grain Inspection, Packers and
Stockyards Administration (GIPSA) defines captive sup-
plies as any cattle that are under the control of the ultimate
buyer fourteen days or more prior to slaughter. The three
main categories of captive supply are packer-fed cattle, cat-
tle purchased through forward contracts, and cattle pur-
chased under marketing agreements.1
Figure 1 reports GIPSA captive supply data from 1999
to 2002 (the latest year reported). Over that period of
time, captive supplies increased from 32.4% to 44.4% of
total steer and heifer slaughter.2 Virtually all of that
increase occurred through the use of marketing agree-
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ments. These arrangements tend to
be longer-run, standing agreements.
They often give feeders considerable
influence over the timing of cattle
delivery. Such agreements also often
involve the use of individual (or grid)
pricing of cattle. In many cases, the
packer provides information on the
carcass merits of the cattle back to
the feeder for use in future manage-
ment decisions.
The inability of the price system
to efficiently convey information
along the supply chain often has been
cited as contributing to the substan-
tial decline in beef demand through-
out the 1980s. Although marketing
agreements and forward contracting
clearly provide a logical means of
dealing with this perceived problem,
the practice has been controversial.
This controversy stems from concern
that packers may be able to use cap-
tive supplies strategically to depress
prices. In 1996, GIPSA concluded a
multiyear, congressionally mandated
study of this issue. Results were
somewhat mixed, showing a negative
(but small) relationship between cap-
tive supply cattle as a percent of total
cattle purchases and transaction
price.
More recently, the controversy
over captive supplies has been taken
to Congress and the courts. The Sen-
ate version of the 2002 Farm Bill
included an amendment offered by
Tim Johnson of South Dakota that
would have banned “packer control”
of cattle prior to slaughter.3 The
Johnson amendment did not make it
into the final version of the Farm
Bill, but debate over the provision
was intense.
In the courts, in early 2004, an
Alabama jury issued a $1.28 billion
judgment against Tyson Fresh Meats
in a lawsuit brought by a group of
cattle producers. The suit alleged that
IBP (subsequently purchased by
Tyson Foods, Inc.) had used captive
supplies to depress cattle prices in the
spot market. A judge later overturned
the jury’s decision, stating that there
was no legally sufficient evidence to
support the jury’s verdict or the size
of the award. However, the issue has
not been put to rest, as the producers
have filed an appeal that will likely be
heard in early 2005.
Although many producers vocally
opposed the Johnson amendment to
the 2002 Farm Bill and the position
1. Marketing agreements estab-
lish an ongoing relationship 
between the buyer and seller of 
cattle, in contrast to forward 
contracts, which generally apply 
only to a single transaction.  
Marketing agreements typi-
cally specify the number of cat-
tle to be delivered per time 
period and the means by which 
cattle will be priced (often 
through a pricing formula).
2. GIPSA data on packer feeding 
go back as far as 1954.  GIPSA 
began collecting data on for-
ward contract and market 
agreement purchases in 1988; 
however, prior to 1999, GIPSA 
reported unaudited data as 
reported by packers.  Since 
1999, GIPSA has audited the 
data it reports.  For this reason, 
it is difficult to compare current 
data on captive supplies to that 
reported prior to 1999.
3. During debate over this provi-
sion, proponents of the ban held 
that the rather ambiguous term 
“packer control” referred strictly 
to packer ownership of cattle, 
not to forward contracting or 
marketing agreements.
Figure 1. Packer feeding and forward purchases as a percentage of total steer and
heifer slaughter-four largest packers.
Note. From USDA Grain Inspection Packers and Stockyards Administration. (2004). Packers and Stockyards 
Statistical Report: 2002 Reporting Year (GIPSA SR-04-1). Washington DC: USDA.
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of the plaintiffs in the Pickett vs.
Tyson Fresh Meats case, grassroots
support for both of these causes has
been significant—has been, in fact, a
driving force. For example, an amicus
brief was recently filed in support of
the Pickett appeal. This brief was
joined by more than 50 individuals
and grassroots organizations, includ-
ing many with a national presence
such as the Ranchers-Cattlemen’s
Action Legal Fund, United Stock-
growers of America (R-CALF USA),
the Organization for Competitive
Markets (OCM), and the National
Farmer’s Organization. These, along
with many other producer groups on
record as being strongly opposed to
the practice of packer feeding and
contracting, are also among the most
ardent supporters of mandatory
COOL.
Changing the Rules Requires 
Changing the Structure
Given the current structural state of
the industry and the visceral obses-
sion with market structure issues, it
seems ironic that the implications of
COOL on the structure of the beef
industry have not been a large issue
in the COOL debate. Because
COOL requires retailers to be able to
guarantee the accuracy of their label-
ing, a fundamental shift in the trans-
actions cost for retailers would be
expected. In a world where “anything
goes,” an open market procurement
system where retailers seek out the
lowest cost source of supply is suffi-
cient to coordinate production and
consumption. When one factors in
supply risk and food-safety concerns,
the incentives for retailers to verti-
cally coordinate with packers and
wholesalers becomes more impor-
tant, leading the industry beyond its
current structure.
The mandatory COOL program
adds the requirement that the retailer
be able to guarantee information on
the source of the beef being presented
to consumers. The question is: “How
might one achieve this high level of
information availability and integ-
rity?” In the absence of some inter-
vening force, the costs of researching,
certifying, and trusting source infor-
mation in an open procurement mar-
ket are surely higher than if the
system were vertically coordinated. If
that hypothesis were true, then the
impact of COOL on transactions
costs would suggest that the policy
creates more pressure for contracting
in beef, not less. Grassroots organiza-
tion within the beef industry that, on
the one hand, argue vociferously for
COOL, but, on the other, display
considerable antipathy toward con-
tracting, demonstrate that the poten-
tial linkage between COOL and
contracting has not been adequately
explored in this debate.
To illustrate the argument in a
context that is free from the emo-
tional baggage of COOL, consider
the case of a retailer that wanted to
market a product based on its loca-
tion of origin because it perceived
that consumers valued that informa-
tion. Now, one could simply go into
the market and purchase the product
with little concern about the “truth”
of the claims by the wholesaler. But,
one could imagine the Dateline TV
exposé on your company when they
find out that you are making claims
you cannot guarantee and the requi-
site class-action lawsuits that follow.
So, what do you do? One logical
solution is to bind the wholesaler in a
contract which shifts the legal liabil-
ity for certifying that your product
does, in fact, come from where you
claim it does from yourself to the
wholesaler. The wholesaler, of course,
wishes to shift legal liability back to
the processor, and, so on. The central
point of this simple illustration is
that a choice by the retailer to pro-
vide information on a product
attribute as a marketing tool led to
this shift in market structure. In
COOL, the provision of this infor-
mation is mandated.
One should recognize that there
are many simultaneous forces exert-
ing themselves on the beef market—
foreign animal diseases, product
branding, international sourcing and
trade restrictions, to name a few—
each with potentially different effects
on market structure and perfor-
mance. The structural impacts of
COOL are just a part of the myriad
of issues facing the beef industry.
However, it seems clear that without
some intervening force, COOL is
likely to increase pressure for con-
tracting in beef.
The Potential Intervening 
Force—Animal Identification
The potential impact of COOL on
the use of forward contracts and mar-
keting agreements in the cattle indus-
try has been complicated somewhat
by the related issue of animal identi-
fication. In the wake of the Decem-
ber 2003 discovery of a dairy cow in
Washington state infected with
Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy
(BSE), the USDA announced its
intention to implement a compre-
hensive animal identification pro-
gram. Although the ID program
would be geared toward providing
rapid animal tracking capabilities in
the event of a disease outbreak, such
a system could perhaps be useful in
meeting the requirements of a food-
labeling program like mandatory
COOL.
The National Animal Identifica-
tion System (NAIS), as currently pro-
posed, would include a uniform
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individual-animal numbering system.
Production information would not
be required; however, information on
animal movement (both intra- and
interstate) as well as changes in own-
ership would be tracked in the sys-
tem. The result will ideally be a
concise, easily accessible record of
where an animal originated and
where it has been throughout its life.
If the NAIS can feasibly be
implemented as planned, the infor-
mation it could provide ought to
facilitate the development of a
COOL program. Each animal would
have a record of its origin and move-
ment. That record would, by design,
follow the animal through the supply
chain. This tracking capability is
consistent with the needs of the
COOL (or any other labeling) pro-
gram.
The NAIS will not necessarily
address all of the concerns related to
COOL (e.g., additional costs
required for segregating product by
location of origin at the wholesale
and retail level); however, it does
potentially represent one reasonable
means of collecting and transferring
the information required for the
COOL program. Consequently, an
effective identification system poten-
tially reduces the incentive for con-
tracting created by COOL. If the
provenance of every steer and heifer
coming out of the feedlot is readily
available through the identification
system, there is less reason for retail-
ers to rely on contracting as a means
of reliably and efficiently securing
this information.
Although the NAIS would pro-
vide tracking capability from birth to
slaughter, one should keep in mind
the difficulty of maintaining identifi-
cation from slaughtering through
fabricating a carcass into many hun-
dreds of products. Animal tracking is
one part, but keeping identification
through processing is more difficult
and potentially costly. Exactly how
beef trimmings are to be identified is
not clear. Plants or days could be
identified as US only, but these struc-
tural issues certainly will affect trans-
action costs. Although they may
satisfy COOL requirements, they
may not be a traceback system.
Although a national animal iden-
tification system may reduce the cost
of country-of-origin labeling, this is
not to say that it will reduce total
costs to the system. The higher trans-
action costs associated with the
requirements of labeling will, in
effect, become costs associated with
the identification program—a pro-
gram that provides additional bene-
fits besides simply facilitating origin
labeling. These costs will be the same
whether animals are contracted or
traded on the open market, because
the requirement of the identification
program will have to be met on all
animals. 
Summary and Conclusions
Well over two years have elapsed
since passage of the COOL provi-
sions in the 2002 Farm Bill. In that
time, few if any of the more contro-
versial aspects of the policy have been
resolved, at least within the beef
industry. Debate still swirls around
questions such as how much the pro-
gram will cost and what its potential
benefits might be. At the same time,
controversy continues to surround
the issue of vertical integration and
coordination in the beef industry.
Pending court cases and the potential
for additional legislation related to
captive supplies will keep this issue
front-and-center for the foreseeable
future.
The relationship between manda-
tory COOL, captive supplies, and
other structural changes in the beef
industry (e.g., closer vertical coordi-
nation between processors and retail-
ers) has unfortunately been virtually
ignored in the lengthy debate over
labeling policy. It is long past time for
industry participants and policy
makers to take up this discussion.
Some important issues should be
addressed now in order to avoid (or
at least minimize) further controversy
in the future.
If mandatory COOL does lead to
greater vertical coordination through
nonprice means (such as forward
contracting and use of marketing
agreements) what are the implica-
tions for the beef industry? For exam-
ple, will price discovery problems
associated with thin markets (already
a topic of discussion in the industry)
become a significant problem? More
generally, will industry participants
view an increase in captive supplies as
an acceptable side effect of COOL,
or will this simply exacerbate the cur-
rent conflict, leading to additional
litigation and political maneuvering?
Historic precedent in the industry
clearly favors the latter outcome.
That being the case, industry leaders
and policy makers would do well to
consider what might be done now to
reduce the potential for future con-
flicts—perhaps, for example, making
changes to the provisions of manda-
tory COOL and/or working to more
explicitly align the goals of COOL
and the nascent NAIS. 
 John D. Anderson is an associate
extension professor and Darren Hud-
son is an associate professor in the
Department of Agricultural Econom-
ics at Mississippi State University.
CHOICES
The magazine of food, farm, and resource issues
4th Quarter 2004 CHOICES 25
A publication of the
American Agricultural
Economics Association
4th Quarter 2004
©1999–2005 CHOICES. All rights reserved. Articles may be reproduced or electronically distributed as long as attribution to Choices and the American
Agricultural Economics Association is maintained. Choices subscriptions are free and can be obtained through http://www.choicesmagazine.org.
Potential Deficit Reduction Efforts and 
WTO Cotton Ruling Adding to Policy 
Uncertainty
Hal Harris and Joe Outlaw
2005 is shaping up to be an interesting year for agricul-
tural policy in the United States. Here we are, three years
into a six-year farm bill, and commodity organizations and
other agricultural interest groups are starting to get itchy.
Most agricultural policy observers would agree that any
changes made to existing agricultural policies during 2005
will result in less support for agriculture rather than more.
In recent years, when a cut or offset was needed, conserva-
tion programs were looked to first. But is that what would
happen now?
Several forces are converging that are likely to create
policy and therefore financial uncertainty for U.S. farmers
and ranchers. Persistent rumors of impending Congres-
sional efforts to curtail the budget deficit via budget recon-
ciliation have many interested parties asking: “How much
will the cut be, and how are they going to do it?” Obvi-
ously, the people who know the answer to these questions
aren’t volunteering any information. Budget reconciliation
may not even happen. But at this point, there have been
many comments suggesting that it is a very real possibility.
Otherwise, why would several of the major commodity
organizations consider hiring a former House Agricultural
Committee Chair to help them try to “hold the line” on
future budget cuts? Whether the threat of budget reconcil-
iation is real or not—at this point, perception is reality.
The second force causing heartburn is the WTO rul-
ing on the Brazilian cotton case against the United States.
There are some who thought (and still think, for that mat-
ter) that the 2002 farm bill is fully compliant with U.S.
WTO obligations. There are at least a few members of
Congress who take exception to being forced into chang-
ing U.S. commodity programs by foreign governments.
Although the cotton ruling has drawn a lot of attention
from the media, it was not the slam-dunk win that initial
reports indicated.  There are some who think that the U.S.
appeal will be successful, but others point to the fact that
there are several examples of countries losing cases that
have continued programs found to be in violation of
WTO rules. Whether in the court of the WTO or of
international public opinion, it will be difficult for the
United States to completely ignore a loss of the appeal.
And the bottom line is pretty clear—the U.S. cotton pro-
gram does have an impact on world cotton prices.
The collection of papers in this edition of Choices is
intended to cover four of the big issues in agricultural pol-
icy today. The article by Flinchbaugh and Knutson sets the
stage for the Agricultural Policy Outlook for 2005 theme
by reminding us how we got to this point in agricultural
policy and where we are likely to go in the future.
The article by Mercier provides an excellent summary
of the WTO, the U.S. role in the WTO, and reflections
on the Brazilian cotton case as it may or may not influence
U.S. agricultural policy in the coming years. 
The third article, by Cain and Lovejoy, provides a his-
torical perspective on U.S. conservation programs and
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thoughts on the increased impor-
tance of conservation programs in
the future. 
In the final article, Richardson
and Outlaw discuss the issues associ-
ated with cutting commodity pay-
ments to farmers. The reality is that
it is not as easy as one would think,
and equity issues will almost certainly
arise.
As we continue the process
toward a new farm bill, Choices
encourages readers to share ideas con-
tributing to the interesting debate
that lies ahead.
Hal Harris is professor emeritus in
the Department of Applied Econom-
ics & Statistics at Clemson Univer-
sity. Joe Outlaw, Choices co-editor, is
an associate professor and Extension
economist in the Department of Agri-
cultural Economics at Texas A&M
University. 
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The Agricultural Policy Outlook: Looking 
Back Focuses the Road Ahead
Barry Flinchbaugh and Ron Knutson
The talk on the street, in the coffee shops, and certainly
among academic economists is that conventional farm
programs are in big trouble. They cite:
• election results and the loss of farm program advocates
(such as Congressman Stenholm and Senator Daschle)
resulting in a more urban-oriented Congress;
• the WTO decision cutting down US cotton subsidies
and the related Doha Round trade negotiations (see
the Mercier article in this issue); and
• a renewal of restraints on farm program spending,
which has not been a major factor in farm program
deliberations for the past two decades (see the Richard-
son and Outlaw article in this issue).
Without question, these factors represent challenges to
farm bill interest groups, which include more than just
farmers. Adjustments in strategies, new concerted efforts,
and perhaps even new programs will be required. But it is
naive to consider farm programs dead or dying. This arti-
cle explains why. It will do so by updating the history of
farm programs, evaluating the goals of farm policy, and
analyzing the politics of farm programs.
Some Farm Program History
It is often pointed out by the less than well informed that
today’s farm programs have their origin in the depression
days of the 1930s; this gives the impression that they have
not changed much since. The fact is that farm policies
have evolved through three distinct periods, as follows:
Price Support Era (1930s–1960s). Farm policy began with the
government overtly supporting farm prices. When market
prices fell to the support level, the government purchased
and stored commodities. The monuments to this policy
era are the concrete grain storage silos—many of which
now stand empty—across the Corn Belt and the Great
Plains. In fact, government stocks became so large that
prices were generally at the support level, and production
controls ranging from quotas to land retirement programs
were prevalent. Because support prices were too high to be
competitive in export markets, the international Food for
Peace program and domestic food distribution programs
were developed.
Income Support Era (1970s–1995). In the 1970s it was realized
that US farmers were missing an opportunity to sell US
farm products for dollars in international markets. Doing
this, however, required a watershed change in farm policy
from supporting farm prices to supporting farm income.
The government storage bins were emptied, resulting in
sharp declines and gyrations in market prices. The mecha-
nism for supporting income involved the government set-
ting a politically acceptable target price or loan rate and
agreeing to pay the difference when the market price fell
below the target price (or loan rate). During this era, farm-
ers relied on the government-guaranteed target price (or
loan rate) as a major element in their production deci-
sions. Yet from time to time the government stepped in to
control production, importantly as a means of reducing
government costs. Also during this era, commodity distri-
bution programs converted to food assistance and mush-
roomed to about half of the USDA’s budget. In the
absence of commodities in government hands and with
the development of convenience foods, nutrition pro-
grams developed into predominately food stamps and cash
subsidies to schools. 
Market-Oriented Era (1996–present). Although the political
rhetoric of the income-support era frequently made refer-
ence to more market-oriented policies, it was not until the
1996 Farm Bill that farmers were free to make decisions
on what to produce based on market prices as opposed to
government-determined payments. This was accom-
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plished through the establishment of
a system of government-determined
direct payments that were not tied to
either production or price. These
payments were referred to as decou-
pled payments to reflect the fact that
they were not tied to either price or
production. Yet the system was not
purely decoupled from price, because
the marketing loan remained in
effect, and the Congress added sup-
plemental payments when price fell
during the late 1990s. The 2002
Farm Bill amounted to a further
reversion from decoupling by adding
payments that were tied to price but
not to production, which raised seri-
ous questions as to how committed
US policy makers were to decoupled
farm polices. This is one of the cen-
tral decisions policy makers face in
the next farm bill. That decision will
be made in an international political
environment that frowns on high US
farm program payments that enhance
farm output and reduce world mar-
ket prices (see the Mercier article in
this issue). However, until 1996
farmers were restrained in their abil-
ity to receive payments on crops for
which they had no production his-
tory. Likewise, during this era pro-
duction controls were largely
eliminated, with the exception of the
politically-sensitive sugar program
and environmentally-sensitive Con-
servation Reserve Program lands.
This period also introduced the con-
cept of the government buying out
the capitalized value of farm program
benefits in return for making the pea-
nut and tobacco programs more mar-
ket oriented. While food assistance
programs continued to grow, conser-
vation programs were rejuvenated
with a green payment environmental
orientation. 
Evolution of the Goals of Farm 
Policy
Logically, farm policy would be
developed based on a specific set of
goals. A review of the preambles to
farm bills, where goals might be
expected to be specified, suggests that
this logic is seldom realized. Yet the
changing substance of farm bills over
time suggests a substantial evolution
of policy goals, as indicated by the
following:
• The social goal of saving the fam-
ily farm has evolved into an eco-
nomic goal of providing tools by
which farm businesses can reduce
risk. Implied in this change is
that the government cannot save
farms that do not have the scale
of operation, the technology, and
the level of specialization that
allows them to be efficient in pro-
duction and effective in market-
ing and management. However,
limits on government payments
to large farm operations can be
expected to continue to be a con-
tentious policy issue.
• The goal of adjusting production
to market needs has evolved into
the goal of expanding demand,
remaining competitive, and
achieving open markets interna-
tionally. This goal is supported by
US initiatives in expanding trade
agreements and negotiating for
increased market access in the
World Trade Organization.
• The goal of soil conservation has
evolved into a goal of sustainable
production in the utilization of
land, air, and water. The meaning
of stewardship is expanding
beyond soil conservation to
maintain clean air, clean water,
and humane animal production
systems. From a regulatory per-
spective, agriculture is being
treated increasingly as other
industries are, but government
will be there to help farmers with
the transition if farm organiza-
tions are wise and flexible enough
to seize upon the opportunity.
• The goal of food reserves has
evolved into a goal of food secu-
rity, food safety, and homeland
security. New looks are being
taken at how to protect the integ-
rity of the food supply chain
from farm to table in an era of
globalization. The impacts of
increased emphasis on food safety
and security will be greatest at the
farm level, domestically and
internationally. This is the case
because while processors and
marketers are adjusting rapidly to
this new goal, farmers have
resisted adjustment.
• The goal of domestic demand
expansion has evolved to eating
wisely and in moderation. Obe-
sity has become a major policy
issue that cannot be ignored in
the context of an omnibus farm
policy. The potential impacts
extend beyond food assistance
(roughly half of the USDA’s bud-
get) and nutrition education to
farm production.
• The goal of expanding the use of
agriculture’s production capacity
production for energy production
needs to be officially recognized.
Continued expansion of public
support for industrial uses of
agricultural products are a conse-
quence of high oil prices, the
need for energy security, the abil-
ity to reduce pollution from ani-
mal agriculture by capturing
energy from animal waste, and
new technologies for production
of bio-energy. 
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Politics and the 2007 Farm Bill
The results of the election put agri-
culture in a favorable political posi-
tion. The six Plains states, where
farm incomes and land values are
most affected by farm programs,
voted decisively for the President.
The political and economic impor-
tance of agriculture is understood by
Secretary Johanns and the elected
members of the Congress in this
rural-oriented region. 
Satisfying the goals of the 2007
Farm Bill does not mean less govern-
ment. It does mean a different type of
government and a continuing evolu-
tion of farm, food, and resource pol-
icy. Likewise, it does not necessarily
mean less government payments for
farmers, but a reorientation of pay-
ments to forms that facilitate adjust-
ment to make agriculture more
environmentally friendly and
humane, more specialized on the
commodities for which we can be
competive internationally, and more
responsive to markets with less dis-
torting effects.
Making the transition to this new
policy orientation will not be easy, as
was indicated by the 2002 Farm Bill
and subsequent developments. If
farm organizations continue to live in
the past, where they are more com-
fortable, their influence will decline.
However, if they recognize their
minority status and develop a com-
mon policy position that considers
the goals and realities of the time,
farm program benefits will continue
to be an important feature of farm
survival.
Barry Flinchbaugh is a professor in
the Department of Agricultural Eco-
nomics at Kansas State University,
Manhattan, Kansas. Ron Knutson is
professor emeritus at Texas A&M
University, College Station, Texas.
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The WTO and US Agricultural Policy: 
Intersections and Consequences
Stephanie Mercier
Introduction
Except during the Korean War and in 1959, US agricul-
ture has recorded a positive trade balance on a fiscal year
basis since the second year of World War II. Largely as a
result of agricultural productivity growth during the 20th
century, US agricultural production consistently exceeds
the domestic demand for food, feed, and fiber, resulting in
an increasing reliance by US agriculture on foreign mar-
kets for sales of US products. The US policy approach
looks toward multilateral reform of agricultural policy
under the auspices of the World Trade Organization
(WTO) as a prime opportunity to achieve gains in market
share.
On the other hand, US agriculture also has been the
beneficiary of federal farm spending over approximately
the same period, intended to support prices and/or
income of American farmers, with the stated objective of
maintaining a healthy rural economy. Periodically, Con-
gress re-examines legislation that authorizes such pro-
grams, commonly known as farm bills. The current farm
bill is due to expire in 2007.
Several key features of the US farm programs are
regarded by trade analysts as highly distorting of trade and
production due to their direct linkage to movements in
commodity price and the volume of production or
exports. The agricultural reform efforts in the Uruguay
Round focused on reducing these types of policies. Both
that round and the current negotiations to reform agricul-
tural trade rules under the WTO have been focused on
three main areas: (a) improving export competition by
ending subsidization of exports, (b) improving market
access by reducing tariff rates and eliminating non-tariff
barriers, and (c) reducing use of the most trade-distorting
forms of domestic support.1
Consequently, US support for trade reform within the
WTO, if successful, implies changes in US farm pro-
grams—a process that should come to a head in the next
few years.
Background
In 1994, 125 countries signed the Final Act of the Uru-
guay Round in Marrakech, Morocco establishing the
WTO and subsuming the General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade (GATT). The various agreements were built on
GATT rules, most notably creating a legally binding dis-
pute settlement mechanism and including agricultural
trade, trade in services, and trade-related intellectual prop-
erty rights issues as areas subject to multilateral reforms for
the first time.
As of October 2004, there were 148 signatories to the
WTO, with 25 more countries in negotiations to accede
to the organization. Member countries are currently
engaged in a new round of multilateral negotiations for-
mally known as the Doha Development Agenda (DDA),
with the stated objective of strengthening existing rules
and continuing to reform trade policy and improve market
access across the entire spectrum of trade in goods and ser-
vices. 
A so-called framework agreement, reached in July
2004, set consensus boundaries on how negotiations in all
key areas will be undertaken, but much work and bargain-
ing will be necessary before a final agreement can be
reached. Disputes with respect to issues in agricultural
trade have impeded overall progress in the round. In par-
ticular, a significant rift has opened up between developed
and developing countries as to how much reform they are
1. Member countries are committed to cap and reduce 
the most trade-distorting domestic farm support pro-
grams under the Uruguay Round. These are known as 
amber box programs.
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willing to undertake in the three key
areas of export competition, market
access, and domestic support. Devel-
oping countries, under the loose
coordination of the G-20 group led
by Brazil, India, Argentina, and
South Africa, have increasingly
asserted themselves in negotiations, a
role they first adopted at the failed
Ministerial meetings in Cancun,
Mexico in September 2003. They are
seeking to force developed countries
to firmly commit to significant
reforms before they will agree to even
consider their own reforms.
US Role in WTO Trade 
Negotiations
The United States was one of 23
original contracting parties to the
GATT, which went into force in
1948. Eight rounds of negotiations
intended to liberalize trade were initi-
ated under the auspices of the GATT;
the last round, known as the Uru-
guay Round (URAA) after its launch
in 1986 in Punta del Este, Uruguay,
culminated in the establishment of
the WTO. Two of the rounds were
named after officials of the US gov-
ernment—Douglas Dillon, Underse-
cretary of State in the Eisenhower
Administration (and later Secretary
of Treasury between 1961 and 1965),
and President John F. Kennedy—
indicating the prominent role taken
by the United States in pushing the
liberalization process over the years.
Initially, most GATT members,
including the US government,
insisted on keeping their agricultural
sectors out of the jurisdiction of the
GATT. These exemptions or excep-
tions were embodied in Article XVI
of the original GATT agreement
(amended in 1955), exempting pri-
mary products (including agricul-
ture) from prohibitions against use of
export subsidies, and Article XI,
which excepted agriculture from
restrictions against use of export or
import restrictions under certain
conditions.
The United States did propose to
include tariffs on agricultural prod-
ucts among reductions to be negoti-
ated in the Dillon and Kennedy
Rounds in the 1960s, but those pro-
posals were blocked by members of
the European Union (then known as
the European Economic Community
[EEC]), which had formed in 1957.
Early in its history, the EEC was
focused on developing a Common
Agricultural Policy (CAP), which was
intended to help European farmers
produce enough food to feed all of
Europe without having to rely on
imports. The major policies adopted
to reach this goal were high support
prices, export subsidies, and corre-
spondingly high tariffs or variable
levies to prevent imported commodi-
ties from competing with domestic
production. These policies, regarded
as highly trade-distorting by most
analysts, were in place through the
1990s, but the support price compo-
nent of the CAP for most commodi-
ties is being phased out in favor of
direct payments, which are increas-
ingly decoupled from production
decisions. These changes are being
made to achieve greater predictability
in budget costs as well from a desire
to position the CAP for further
WTO reforms.
In both the Uruguay Round and
the Doha Round, the US govern-
ment submitted initial proposals in
the agricultural negotiations that
were among the most far-reaching
offered. Both proposals were sup-
ported by the majority of US agricul-
tural groups as well as many
members of Congress from farm
states.2 Under the trade promotion
authority provided to the President
in the Trade Act of 2002, Congress
limits itself to an up-or-down deci-
sion on legislation implementing
trade agreements without being able
to offer amendments; Congress does
not vote on the trade agreements
themselves.
Agricultural Trade Negotiations 
in the Doha Round 
Article XX of the URAA specifically
committed countries to resume agri-
cultural negotiations one year before
the end of the implementation
period, in January 2000. A number
of countries, including the United
States, submitted proposals during
the summer of 2000 intended to
establish the scope of the reform that
would be undertaken. A WTO Min-
isterial meeting held in Doha, Qatar
in November 2001 affirmed coun-
tries’ commitments to the overall
process and established vaguely-
worded objectives for agricultural
reform and a timeline for completion
by January 2005.
Utilizing concepts contained in
the various proposals submitted by
member countries in 2000 and
resubmitted with minor changes in
2002, the chair of the agricultural
negotiations, Stuart Harbinson,
released a document for consider-
ation in March 2003. This draft text,
outlining proposed modalities or
methods for proceeding to reform
export competition, market access,
and domestic support, was intended
to forge a compromise between the
more far-reaching types of reforms
proposed by the United States, Aus-
2. Groups such as the National 
Farmers Union and American 
Corn Growers did express dis-
appointment with the US pro-
posals to reform agriculture 
under the WTO in the Doha 
Round.
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tralia, and others, and the more mod-
est reforms proposed by the EU and
separately by Japan (Table 1). The
Harbinson text was widely rejected.
During 2004, WTO member
countries renewed their efforts to
move agricultural trade negotiations
forward and ultimately agreed in July
2004 on a framework document con-
taining several commitments. They
are summarized as follows:
• In export competition, eliminate
export subsidies over an unspeci-
fied period and impose disci-
plines on use of export credits,
food aid, and state trade enter-
prises.
• In domestic support, reduce
spending on “amber box” pro-
grams on a tiered basis, so that
member countries with the high-
est level of support deemed as sig-
nificantly trade-distorting would
reduce spending in this category
the most. 
• In domestic support, cap support
under the “blue box” category of
spending (programs deemed to
be partially decoupled) to 5% of
total agricultural receipts while
providing for the possibility that
the blue box definition would be
expanded to include US counter-
cyclical payments.
• In market access, reduce bound
tariffs on a tiered basis, so that
countries with the highest tariffs
would have to cut them the most.
However, countries would be
given flexibility to protect their
most sensitive products.
This framework document is
extremely sparse on specific numbers
representing concrete commitments
as to the pace and extent of reform.
However, if the final agreement
includes significant reform of trade-
distorting domestic support pro-
grams, the United States would be
agreeing to modify and/or reduce its
spending on price/income support
programs that are currently reported
to the WTO as amber box programs
in order to meet its obligations.
These programs include the market-
ing assistance loan program for crops
such as wheat, feed grains, rice, cot-
ton, and oilseeds, dairy price sup-
ports, and the sugar program. If the
Doha Round is completed in the
next few years, changes to these pro-
grams are likely to be incorporated in
the 2007 farm bill.
However, such a deal is not a
foregone conclusion, as member
countries have taken very strong
positions about how much they are
willing to concede in this round,
especially in the agricultural talks. In
a November 2004 conference in Ath-
ens, GA, American Farm Bureau
Federation President Bob Stallman,
leader of the country’s largest farm
group, said, “If the world wants us to
decrease our domestic supports, we
must be met in-kind with increased
market access for all farm goods. Tar-
iffs and other barriers to trade must
also be targets in the crosshairs.”
It is not clear that a final deal on
agriculture that would fulfill terms
such as those enunciated by Mr.
Stallman can be struck based on the
July 2004 framework agreement.
Although the main user of export
subsidies, the EU, has conceded its
willingness to eliminate them over an
unspecified period, developing coun-
tries in particular have balked at
making significant concessions on
market access. Although US farm
groups do not hold veto authority
over trade deals negotiated by the US
government, they have direct access
to the lead US negotiators as mem-
bers of Congressionally-authorized
advisory committees. They have also
demonstrated considerable influence
in the past in convincing members of
Congress to vote for trade agree-
ments they favor. Because the most
recent legislation which granted the
Table 1. Key features of initial US and EU agricultural proposals in the Doha Round.
US proposal EU proposal
Export competition •Eliminate export subsidies over a fixed period
•End single-desk trading by State trading entities
•Prohibit use of export taxes by state trading entities
•Reduce export subsidies by 45% on outlays
•Discipline use of export credits and food aid
•Discipline unfair practices
Market access •Harmonize tariff levels among countries, with no tariff 
greater than 25%
•Reduce tariffs from applied rates
•Increase TRQs for sensitive products
•End use of special safeguard
•Reduce tariffs an average of 36%, with 15% minimum
•Provide duty-free, quota-free access to agricultural products from 
LDCs
•Discipline TRQs
•Keep special safeguard
Domestic support •Combine amber and blue box supports,a limit to 5% of 
total value
•Reduce amber box AMS (aggregate measure of support) by 55% of 
agricultural products
•Eliminate use of amber box de minimis by developed countries
Note: Summarized from proposals submitted to WTO during fall of 2002.
aBlue box programs are deemed to be trade-distorting but mitigated by use of offsetting production-limiting mechanisms. Spending on blue box programs is 
not capped under the Uruguay Round.
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President the authority to negotiate
such agreements passed by only one
vote in the House of Representatives
in 2002, even modest shifts in senti-
ment on trade issues can have a sig-
nificant impact, whether it occurs
among agricultural interest groups or
other groups with political influence.
WTO Dispute Resolution
Out of the new or strengthened com-
ponents of the WTO as compared to
the GATT, the US government was
particularly pleased with the provi-
sions of Annex 2 of the Final Act,
which established a new legally bind-
ing dispute settlement understanding
procedure. Previous US efforts to
pursue complaints under the GATT
were frustrated by the ability of either
party to reject the findings of the dis-
pute settlement panel and prevent
them from taking effect. For exam-
ple, in agriculture, successful cases
under the GATT against the EU
banana trade regime and the EU ban
on hormone-treated beef were ren-
dered moot by the lack of an effective
enforcement mechanism.
Within a few years after the
WTO agreements took effect, the US
and other member countries filed
new cases against these two EU poli-
cies and won the support of dispute
settlement panels. However, it took
four years for the EU to come up
with a new banana regime that satis-
fied the other parties, and after more
than seven years, the EU has yet to
take action in the beef hormone case
that satisfies the US and Canada,
which was the other complaining
party. Unlike with cases filed under
the GATT, winning parties under the
WTO process are permitted to retali-
ate against parties that fail to come
into compliance with panel findings
through imposition of additional tar-
iffs on selected export products
sourced from that country.
Through October 2004, there
have been 317 separate cases pursued
under the WTO dispute settlement
procedure, although not all have
been followed through to establish
panels. During that period, the
United States filed 69 complaints
under the dispute settlement pro-
cess, 21 of them dealing with trade in
food or agricultural products. The
United States has also been the
respondent in 80 other cases, 11 of
these cases addressing trade in food
or agricultural products. From the
viewpoint of US agricultural policy,
the case filed by the government of
Brazil against the US cotton support
programs in September 2002 was the
first to call US commodity programs
directly into question.
Brazil Cotton Case
Brazil’s case challenged aspects of
both the US domestic support system
and the export programs. The core of
Brazil’s case with respect to US
domestic support programs consisted
of two main arguments. First, the
level of support provided to US cot-
ton producers between 1999 and
2002 under the 1996 and 2002 farm
bills exceeded the level that guaran-
teed these programs immunity from
challenge as illegal subsidies under
previously existing trade rules. Sec-
ond, if the panel agreed with the
claim that US programs should be
denied such protection under the so-
called Peace Clause (Article XIII) of
the URAA, the government of Brazil
asserted that the cumulative effect of
the programs caused harm to Brazil’s
cotton producers, which constituted
a violation of the Subsidies and
Countervailing Measures Agreement
of the WTO, which restricts use of
subsidies that cause harm to produc-
ers in other countries. 
Other key arguments of Brazil’s
case dealt with the US export credit
guarantee program and a separate
program (the Step 2 program) that
provides a subsidy to cover the differ-
ence between domestic cotton prices
and the world cotton price for either
export transactions or sales to domes-
tic millers. Brazil argued that both
programs were operated as export
subsidies; because the US govern-
ment failed to report them as export
subsidies in the Uruguay Round and
has not limited program expenditures
consistent with US reduction com-
mitments on export subsidies, these
programs should be deemed as pro-
hibited export subsidies by the WTO
dispute settlement panel. If the panel
agreed with that claim, then it should
require that the cotton Step 2 pro-
gram be terminated by the US gov-
ernment, and the export credit
guarantee program should be ended
for those commodities not covered
under the US export subsidy com-
mitment. The portion of the case
addressing export credit guarantees
addressed all commodities covered by
the program, not just cotton.
In a ruling released publicly in
September 2004, the initial dispute
panel found in favor of Brazil on
most points (Table 2). The United
States filed a formal appeal the fol-
lowing month. The Appellate Body’s
decision is expected in March 2005.
The text of the panel’s ruling on the
Brazil cotton case provides little guid-
ance as to what steps the US govern-
ment should take to reform domestic
support programs, if it decides to
comply with the ruling by modifying
the programs rather than provide
compensation. It is important to note
that the panel declined to support
Brazil’s claim that the programs
included in the 2002 farm bill threat-
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ened to cause serious harm to Brazil’s
cotton producers in the remaining
years of the legislation. The panel
noted that their finding of past seri-
ous harm hinged on the combined
effect of price-related supports and
the cotton Step 2 and export credit
guarantee programs, and thus they
were unwilling to find that the seri-
ous harm would persist once the lat-
ter two programs are terminated as
would be required under the panel’s
ruling. The government of Brazil has
appealed this aspect of the case.
In addition, the panel’s ruling
would require the US government to
eliminate the cotton Step 2 program
and modify the export credit pro-
gram. The panel ruled that export
credit guarantees could no longer be
used to assist in the export of com-
modities such as cotton, corn, or soy-
beans that were not listed by the US
government as being subject to
reductions under US export subsidy
commitments in the Uruguay
Round.3 Under the WTO rules gov-
erning prohibited subsidies, these
actions would have to be taken by
July 1, 2005.
US Government Response
Except when programs are found to
be prohibited export subsidies, the
rules under which WTO dispute set-
tlement panels operate do not nor-
mally specify how long countries are
allowed to take to modify their pro-
grams or policies to come into com-
pliance with adverse rulings. Past
cases suggest that the more complex
the issues involved, the longer the
matter will take to resolve, especially
if the country or countries filing the
case are not satisfied that the pro-
grams or policies found to be WTO-
incompatible have been properly
fixed. 
For example, although the EU
ban on hormone-treated beef was
judged to be improper under WTO
rules in 1997, the EU has not yet
removed that ban, and there is no
authority available under the WTO
to force such an action. Instead, the
EU has sought to bolster the scien-
tific basis under which the ban was
promulgated, believing such an
action would allow them to maintain
the ban while complying with the
WTO ruling. This matter recently
entered a new stage, as the EU filed
for a WTO dispute settlement panel
in November 2004, seeking to force
the United States and Canada to
drop their sanctions, since the EU
asserts their regulations are now sci-
ence-based and thus in compliance
with the 1997 ruling.
Because the Brazil cotton case
covers entirely new ground in inter-
national trade disputes, and the ini-
tial panel’s report does not prescribe
how compliance should be achieved,
it seems conceivable that resolving
this dispute could take several years,
if we assume that the Appellate Body
does not overturn the original ruling.
One factor that will govern the
length of time to reach resolution
depends on how soon the govern-
ment of Brazil presses the WTO to
establish a deadline for action and
subsequently asks for permission to
impose retaliatory tariffs on US prod-
ucts if the US government does not
meet that deadline. A second compli-
cating factor that could extend the
Table 2. Key findings of dispute settlement panel on Brazil cotton case.
Brazil’s claim Panel’s finding
Peace Clause violated. Peace clause violated because domestic support in 1999-2002 exceeded 1994 levels. This determination 
occurred in part because the panel deemed that fruit and vegetable planting restrictions on PFC and 
direct payments made them ineligible for green box status.
All US domestic support programs caused serious harm to 
Brazil’s cotton producers in 1999-2002.
US price-related programs (marketing loan, countercyclical payments, market loss assistance, Step 2) 
caused serious harm to Brazil’s cotton producers in 1999-2002.
Cotton Step 2 program for exporters is an export subsidy. Cotton Step 2 program is an export subsidy.
Cotton Step 2 program for domestic millers is an illegal import 
substitution subsidy.
Cotton Step 2 program for domestic millers is an illegal import substitution subsidy.
Export credit guarantees are export subsidies for all 
commodities, not just cotton.
Export credit guarantees cannot be used for commodities not scheduled under US export subsidy 
commitment.
US domestic support programs threaten serious harm to Brazil’s 
cotton producers for remainder of 2002 farm bill.
Did not support Brazil’s claim, because finding involved effect of price-related programs and cotton Step 
2 and export credit programs, and the latter two programs are supposed to be terminated.
3. Under the initial panel ruling, 
only the following products 
would be eligible for the export 
credit guarantee programs: 
wheat, wheat flour, barley, veg-
etable oil, butter, skim milk 
powder, cheese, beef, pork, 
poultry, eggs, live dairy cattle, 
and rice. However, the use of 
program for rice is likely to be 
restricted, because the current 
level of rice exports using export 
credit exceeds the level permit-
ted under US export subsidy 
commitments made in the 
Uruguay Round.
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length of time is if the government of
Brazil is not satisfied with the actions
taken by the United States to modify
its programs and seeks a second case
in order to test the WTO compatibil-
ity of the modified programs.
Although the Brazil case was
entirely focused on support for US
cotton producers (except on the
export credit issues), it potentially
has much broader implications for
US agricultural policy. The panel’s
finding that US domestic support
programs for cotton producers were
not entitled to the protection of the
Peace Clause was partly based on a
determination that direct payments
(and Production Flexibility Payments
under the 1996 farm bill) should not
be classified as decoupled (or “green
box”) programs because of the
restrictions imposed on farmers using
program base acres to grow most
types of fruits and vegetables. Some
WTO member countries could
decide to use this finding as a basis
for a new dispute settlement case,
which asserts that the United States
has improperly reported these pay-
ments in the green box category and
thus has violated the US commit-
ment to maintain annual amber box
program spending at $19.1 billion or
less. Brazil’s success in the cotton case
could also lead Brazil or other coun-
tries to file additional cases against
US domestic support programs,
focusing on programs benefiting pro-
ducers of commodities other than
cotton.4 Such actions are far more
likely to occur if agricultural negotia-
tions in the Doha Round over the
next several months are perceived to
stall or fail.
Conclusions
In the next several years, the House
and Senate Agriculture Committees
could face the following matters:
• a possible agreement in the Doha
Round of the WTO;
• a possible direction to modify
certain domestic programs to
come into compliance with the
appellate ruling on the Brazil cot-
ton case;
• annual budget deficits projected
in excess of $400 billion over the
next several years, if one assumes
that expiring tax breaks are
extended and significant numbers
of US troops continue to serve in
Afghanistan and Iraq; and
• expiration of the current farm bill
in 2007.
The perfect storm of the combi-
nation of these legislative responsibil-
ities and likely pressures to reduce the
federal budget deficit could lead US
agricultural policy in new directions.
In the past, federal farm policymak-
ing has been largely evolutionary
rather than revolutionary, but in this
environment, evolution could speed
up dramatically.
Stephanie Mercier is an economist
with the Committee on Agriculture,
Nutrition and Forestry, United States
Senate.
4. The Peace Clause (Article XIII) 
has expired, so countries would 
not have to prove that support 
for a given commodity had 
increased since 1994, only that 
it caused serious harm to pro-
ducers in other countries. 
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History and Outlook for Farm Bill 
Conservation Programs
Zachary Cain and Stephen Lovejoy
Over the last 70 years, the United States Congress has
taken on the task of determining how federal dollars will
be invested in agriculture through farm bills.1 The focus of
this paper is to determine how conservation programs have
arisen and evolved and to speculate about future direction.
Conservation programs have taken a variety of forms since
1933, usually as vehicles for rural investment, income sup-
port, and supply control. It was not until the mid-1980s
that conservation programs were truly rooted in protecting
natural resources. Several important environmental gains
have been made over the last 70 years, and the future of
conservation programs looks even more promising.
1930s—Depression
The Great Depression of 1929 ushered in hard times for
all Americans, especially farmers. One out of four Ameri-
cans resided on farms at the time; today that figure is less
than one out of 50. Between 1929 and 1932 gross farm
income dropped 52%. In 1933 rural incomes were 40% of
urban incomes, and there was 30% unemployment in
urban areas (Doering, 1997). When FDR was elected in
1933, he promised “definite efforts to raise the values of
agricultural products” (Hurt, 2002). His administration,
under the leadership of Secretary of Agriculture Henry A.
Wallace, produced the first farm bill: the 1933 Agricul-
tural Adjustment Act (PL 73-10). Wallace understood
the financial crisis that faced rural Americans; the best way
to get cash to rural, predominantly agricultural focused
areas was via farm programs. Direct payments were not an
option at this point in history; governments giving money
directly to individuals would have been seen as socialistic.
The Agricultural Adjustment Act began a time-hon-
ored tradition in American agriculture: the notion that it is
necessary to control supply in order for farmers to receive a
fair price for their goods. The act attempted to do this by
setting price supports, or parity prices, to guarantee that
prices did not fall below a set level. This price support was
available to producers who participated in voluntary pro-
duction reduction programs, such as acreage set aside. In
reality, the program was hardly voluntary—those who did
not participate were subject to the uncertainty of low
prices on the open market. The program was financed by
levying a processing tax on the commodities. This tax was
often passed straight to the consumer, who ended up pay-
ing more for food and fiber products. In 1936 this tax was
declared unconstitutional on the grounds that Congress
had passed a tax that was beneficial to one segment of the
nation—the farmer—while causing detriment to everyone
else.
This setback ultimately led to the first conservation
initiatives. Congress needed to infuse cash into rural areas
while controlling supply to achieve higher commodity
prices, ultimately in hope of reducing the dependency of
the American farmer on government subsidies. The Soil
Conservation Act of 1935 (PL 74-46) established the Soil
Conservation Service and made funding available for
farmers who established soil conservation practices. This
mode of bringing cash to farmers had not been challenged
in court, so it became the basis of economic relief in the
next farm bill: the 1936 Soil Conservation and Domestic
Allotment Act (PL 74-461). Congress entitled the bill “an
Act to provide for the protection of land resources against
soil erosion and for other purposes.” These other purposes
were to raise the purchasing power of the American
farmer. Soil conservation was a justifiable public expendi-
ture; Americans had seen how the Dust Bowl had driven
farmers out of the Great Plains. Economic and social pol-
1. “Farm bill” is used throughout this manuscript as a 
common method for referring to Acts of Congress per-
taining to agricultural programs.
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icy analysts saw that conservation was
in the public interest, and therefore
the public should contribute to the
farmer’s costs (Helms, 2003). Soil
conservation had also gained a formi-
dable ally in “Big” Hugh Bennett, the
first director of the Soil Conservation
Service. Bennett used his supreme
showmanship and scientific knowl-
edge to rally Congress and the Amer-
ican public to the need for soil
conservation.
Financial assistance for conserva-
tion in the 1936 Act was called the
Agricultural Conservation Program
(ACP). The ACP sought to reduce
commodity surplus by paying farm-
ers to replace seven soil-depleting
crops with soil-conserving crops. The
seven soil-depleting crops included
corn, cotton, wheat, and other com-
mercial crops the USDA believed to
be in surplus. By planting a grass,
legume, or cover crop in place of one
of these soil-depleting crops, the gov-
ernment would pay the farmer for
participating in soil-conserving prac-
tices out of the general revenue fund
instead of assessing a special tax.
Although this program provided
a constitutional way to get cash to
farmers, it failed to reduce sur-
pluses—surpluses actually grew. This
can be attributed to farmers enrolling
their poorest ground into conserva-
tion programs while using their guar-
anteed income via government
payments to increase yields with fer-
tilizers, machinery, and other tech-
nology on their best ground. The
1938 Agricultural Adjustment Act
sought to decrease these surpluses by
using acreage allotments and the
development of the ever normal gra-
nary to handle excess supply, to no
avail. The act did continue to build
on conservation policy by increasing
payments to participants and setting
rules for how those payments should
be divided between landowners and
producers (tenants and sharecrop-
pers). The 1938 Act also laid the
groundwork for soil conservation dis-
tricts at the county level.
By providing rural Americans
with conservation funding in the late
1930s, the administration was able to
increase the quality of life and eco-
nomic security that was shattered by
the Great Depression. Table 1 pro-
vides a comparison between conser-
vation expenditures in 1937 and
1999 in 2000 constant dollars.
1940s—Wartime
World War II brought a hungry
world market to American producers.
High demand led to higher prices,
and the government developed great
surpluses to ensure national security.
Conservation was put on the back
burner as producers scrambled to
cash in on high prices. This was a
period of turf wars, where the Soil
Conservation Service, land-grant col-
leges, Farm Bureau, extension, the
Department of the Interior, and oth-
ers attempted to shape their roles in
conservation programs. There devel-
oped under Bennett a sense that SCS,
as the keeper of the conservation
flame, had the mandate and mission
to plan and execute a national pro-
gram of soil and water conservation.
Conservation was defined as what the
SCS decided to do. After World War
II, the SCS was project oriented,
conducting activities like the Small
Watershed Program and Great Plains
Conservation Program. These were
seen as public works programs that
usually were funded to benefit the
home district of some congressional
representative (Doering, 1997).
1950s—Dealing with Surpluses
The war ended, demand shrank, and
surpluses grew. Farm bills in 1949
and 1954 did little to control sur-
pluses and less for conservation. The
Agricultural Act of 1956 (PL 70-
540) created the Soil Bank, which
took 29 million acres out of produc-
tion. By transferring these acres into
conserving practices, the govern-
ment could decrease surplus supply
as well as deal with (as stated in the
act) “the stifling effects of erosion
that threatened the welfare of every
American and disrupted markets and
commerce on the whole.” These acres
were to be diverted into soil, water,
forest, and wildlife conservation pro-
grams in exchange for government
rental payments for 10 years.
The Soil Bank was made up of
two specific programs: the acreage
reserve and conservation reserve. The
acreage reserve program made farm-
ers refrain from planting surplus
commodities (corn, wheat, cotton,
rice, peanuts, and several varieties of
tobacco) or plow down the crops
they had already planted. The con-
servation reserve program called for a
three-year contract wherein the gov-
ernment would pay for land
improvements that increased soil,
water, forestry, and wildlife quality if
the farmer would agree not to harvest
or graze contracted land. This act
also stated that newly irrigated or
drained farmland could not be used
to produce these surplus commodi-
ties, as well as providing matching
funds to the state for reforestation of
private lands. Land retirement pro-
grams had several objectives: reduc-
Table 1. Conservation expenditures.
Year 1937 1999
Financial 
assistance
$5,041,700,000 $231,383,000
Technical 
assistance
$261,863,000 $799,578,000
Land 
reserve
$17,655,000 $1,711,163,000
Total $5,321,218,000 $2,742,124,000
Note. Adapted from Doering (2000). 
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ing erosion, supporting farm
incomes, and reducing commodity
price support payments by reducing
the supply and thereby raising mar-
ket prices (Helms, 2003). This
period started a trend that would be
followed until the early 1980s—the
idea that the biggest problem with
soil loss was lost productivity. Several
important lessons would be learned
about land retirement programs by
the failures of the Soil Bank, such as
limiting retirement on a per-county
basis so as not to devastate local
economies and the importance of a
bid system rather than fixed pay-
ments. The acreage reserve ended in
1958 under criticism of its high cost
and failure to reduce production
(Bowers, Rasmussen, & Baker,
1984).
1960s—Targeting Surplus 
Commodities
Surpluses were still the norm in the
1960s, and the government contin-
ued the fight for supply control.
Conservation payments through the
ACP were being used for lime and
drainage, which improved soil qual-
ity and increased yields. In 1962,
38% of funds were spent on fertilizer
and lime. These major outlays were
starting to be questioned as a driving
force behind producing further sur-
pluses. Farm productivity grew by
49% between 1950 and 1970. The
Emergency Feed Grain Act of 1961
(PL 87-5) attempted to take addi-
tional corn and grain sorghum out of
production by paying farmers to
replace production acreage with con-
servation areas. Designed only for
1961, this program continued for
several years. Subsequent acts of the
1960s redefined the set-aside acreage
program, changing contract lengths
and program capacities. The 1965
Act established a cropland adjust-
ment program, giving the Secretary
of Agriculture authority to make 5-
to 10-year contracts with producers
who agreed to convert cropland into
uses that would conserve water, soil,
wildlife, or forest resources, establish
or protect open spaces, natural
beauty, or wildlife or recreational
resources, or prevent air or water pol-
lution. Payments could not exceed
40% of the value of the crop that
would have been planted on that
land.
1970s—Fence Row to Fence Row
The Russians were running out of
food and the Secretary of Agriculture
told farmers to “plant fence row to
fence row” in order to produce
enough crops to meet world demand.
The Russian grain purchases ensured
that prices and demand were high.
American farmers were more than
willing to answer the call to produce
more. In retrospect, this attitude was
very detrimental to the gains that
conservation programs had made
during the previous 40 years. Farmers
tilled up their conservation acreage
and went back to their old ways. A
1977 Congressional study found that
26% of farmers in the Great Plains
Conservation Program had plowed
up their newly established grasslands
for wheat production after their con-
tracts had expired (Doering, 1997).
This emphasizes the difficulty of
maintaining long-term conservation
practices, especially in land retire-
ment programs.
The Agricultural Act of 1970
(PL 91-524) offered further pay-
ments to farmers who were willing to
let fishermen, hunters, and trappers
onto their conservation acreage. The
Water Bank of 1970 was established
to protect the breeding grounds of
migratory waterfowl. The Agricul-
ture and Consumer Protection Act
of 1973 (PL 93-86) authorized long-
term contracts (up to 25 years) for
the Rural Environment Conservation
Program and Water Bank Program.
There was a push in conservation to
increase the “natural beauty” of rural
America. The language used in the
Food and Agriculture Act of 1977
(PL 95-113) shows the USDA was
starting to take a harder look at
sources and solutions for point and
nonpoint farm pollution, including
animal wastes. The administration
began looking not only at water pol-
lution from sediment runoff but also
the overall quality of water supplies
in rural America. This also led to
increased targeting, putting money
where it was deemed most beneficial
for water quality instead of in the
hands of any and all farmers.
1980s—Conservation Policy that 
has Conservation Implications
The farm policy of the 1980s shows a
change in environmental concern.
Until this time, two major themes
had dominated the conservation
debate: first, reducing high levels of
erosion; second, providing water to
agriculture in quantities and qualities
that enhanced production (Zinn,
2001). Increased public awareness
about the deleterious effects farming
had on not only soil quality, but also
water, air, and wildlife, came to life.
Conservation programs started to
focus on conservation, not supply
control or rural development. This
swing in motives can be attributed to
the demands of the environmental
lobby, who found it was easier to
make environmental changes in agri-
culture through farm bills than
through environmental legislation
(Doering, 1999). The 1985 Farm Bill
was the first to have a specific title
devoted to conservation. The true
breakthrough of the 1985 Bill can be
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found in the change in the language
it uses to describe the importance of
soil conservation for reasons other
than productivity gains. It added new
programs: Sodbuster, Swampbuster,
Conservation Compliance, and the
Conservation Reserve Program
(CRP).
Conservation compliance set
high penalties, such as loss of price-
support programs, government crop
insurance, FHA loans, CCC storage
loans, and CRP payments, for own-
ers of highly erodible land (HEL)
that did not develop and implement
a farm conservation plan before
1995. Sodbuster required complete
implementation of a conservation
plan before new HEL could be culti-
vated for the first time. Failure to
comply led to loss of all farm pro-
gram benefits until conservation
plans were fully implemented.
Swampbuster prevented conversion
of wetland areas into production
(Napier, 1990). These programs were
actually enforced early on, causing a
political uproar and turning neigh-
bors and SCS employees into “soil
cops.” The majority of funding went
to putting 36.4 million acres into the
CRP. The CRP was intended to con-
serve not only highly erosive lands
(like soil banks had done in the past)
but also conservation of other biolog-
ically sensitive and important areas.
In essence, the public rented the land
from the farmers to ensure it was
taken out of production. This land
was chosen using a scoring system,
which was unknown to most produc-
ers. The system ranked the environ-
mental improvements that could be
made if the land were taken out of
production. Congress targeted enroll-
ment eligibility to highly erodible
land and other lands that posed an
off-farm environmental threat. The
USDA estimates that the average ero-
sion rate on enrolled acres was
reduced from 21 to less than 2 tons
per acre per year. Even though the
new CRP program was rooted in
resource conservation, it was still
more of the same—supply control
and income support. The programs
implemented by this farm bill had
the potential to make great impacts
in conservation, but it would take the
SCS a few years to put the actual
infrastructure together to make these
programs a reality.
1990s—Keep Conservation 
Rolling
Farm bills passed during the 1990s
continued the advancements in con-
servation that were made in 1985.
1990 witnessed the establishment of
the Wetland Reserve Program (1 mil-
lion acres) and the Ag Water Quality
Protection Program (10 million
acres). The Food, Agriculture, Con-
servation, and Trade Act of 1990
(PL 101-624) addressed ground
water pollution, water quality, and
sustainable agriculture, and allowed
for the use of easements, as well as
amending existing programs. This
period also highlighted the impor-
tance of natural systems larger than
individual farms: landscapes, water-
sheds, and ecosystems (Zinn, 2001).
The 1996 program extended
CRP sign-ups and formed a new
structural, vegetative, and land man-
agement conservation program EQIP
(Environmental Quality Incentives
Program). EQIP started with $200
million in annual funding, half of
which went to livestock producers for
technical and cost-share assistance in
addressing environmental improve-
ments on their operations. The other
half went into programs that EQIP
consolidated: ACP, Great Plains Con-
servation Program, Water Quality
Incentives Program, and Colorado
River Basin Salinity Control Pro-
gram. The ACP, which was once the
dominant conservation program, was
cash starved out of existence. A new
program, Wildlife Habitat Incen-
tives Program (WHIP), was estab-
lished to help induce wildlife habitat
reclamation from production acre-
age. Conservation compliance lost its
teeth through the farm lobby process;
many farmers deemed it too intrusive
on their activities. In 1994, the Soil
Conservation Service was renamed
Natural Resources Conservation Ser-
vice (NRCS).
The language of the 1996 Bill
began to reflect a change from “tar-
geting the ACP program to specific
practices in all counties” to targeting
EQIP to “maximize environmental
benefits per dollar expended” with
less regard to making certain all
counties participated. Programs were
targeted to special “conservation pri-
ority areas,” which functioned to
restrict the flow of conservation dol-
lars away from the general farming
public into areas deemed environ-
mentally critical. This began an
applicant process known as “bid
down,” because landowners usually
had to accept a lower-than-maximum
cost-share rate to be accepted into the
program in order to satisfy the pro-
gram’s environmental objectives
(Helms, 2003). Although focusing
upon maximizing environmental
benefits was an ambitious step for-
ward, the 1996 Farm Bill was only
marginally successful in altering the
distribution of resources, and there
was still substantial targeting of funds
for reasons other than environmen-
tal efficacy.
2000s—Going Green
The 2002 Farm Security and Rural
Investment Act (PL 107-171) con-
tinued to emphasize conservation by
increasing EQIP funding from less
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than $200 million to $1.3 billion
over several years and establishing a
new Conservation Security Program
(CSP). Environmental enhancement
now took priority over other benefits,
such as productivity and supply con-
trol. The 2002 Bill also removed
restrictions that limited the ability of
the USDA to assist larger farmers
(Lovejoy & Doering, 2002). The
CSP pays producers to adopt or
maintain practices that address
resources of concern, such as soil,
water, and wildlife. This “green pay-
ment” program openly recognized
that farmers who had strived for con-
servation and environmental
enhancement also deserved some
financial assistance. The CSP is a
three-tier system; higher tiers require
greater conservation effort and offer
greater payments. However, to date,
the program is still significantly
underfunded. This can be blamed
partially on the funding pipeline,
which is connected to the CCC
instead of the general congressional
funding. Lobbyists believed that by
funding the CSP through the CCC,
the program would not be prone to
the pitfalls of budgetary reductions.
However, the weather dictated other-
wise, as the CCC funding quickly
vanished in the form of disaster pay-
ments to producers after a string of
flooding in the early part of the
decade. In 2004, a total of 2,188
CSP contracts were approved (all
farms that applied were accepted)
covering 1,885,400 acres in 18
watersheds at a cost of $35 million.
Of the 27,300 farms in the 18 water-
sheds, only 8% of farms applied and
received contracts, comprising 14%
of the 14 million eligible acres. The
NRCS has announced plans to
increase from 18 to 202 watersheds
in 2005, which includes about
208,000 eligible farms and ranches
and more than 83 million acres of
farmland. These 202 watersheds are
located in portions of all 50 states
and Caribbean territories, thus
greatly broadening the scope (and
presumably the cost) of the CSP pro-
gram.
Land retirement programs
expanded by this legislation placed a
particular emphasis on wetlands.
CRP acreage was increased from 36.4
to 39.2 million acres, and an addi-
tional 1.2 million acres were added to
the WRP. The 2002 Bill also created
a Grassland Reserve Program (GRP)
to assist landowners in restoring and
conserving grasslands. WHIP
received a tenfold funding increase
over the 1996 Bill. The Farmland
Protection Program, which provides
funds to state, tribal, or local govern-
ments and nonprofit organizations to
help purchase easements against the
development of productive farmland,
also received increased funding.
The Farm Security and Rural
Investment Act increased funding for
environmental programs by 8 times
over the 1996 Farm Bill, but recent
increases in defense and homeland
security spending have made getting
money to these programs difficult.
The 2002 Bill sought to reduce tar-
geting funds by developing a regional
equity provision. This provision gives
priority conservation program fund-
ing to any approved application in
any state that has not received at least
$12 million in funding for the fiscal
year. The “bid down” process was
also removed, and least cost was no
longer used in selecting from applica-
tions with similar environmental
benefits. The 2002 Bill shows a fun-
damental change in the process of
environmental spending. Congress
and the USDA would no longer
attempt to simply maximize the
number of acres in conserving uses,
but rather maximize the environmen-
tal benefits for the expended funds in
all of the conservation titles, (e.g., the
maximum environmental bang for
the buck; Lovejoy & Doering, 2002).
Future of Farm Bill Conservation 
Programs
What will conservation programs of
future farm bills look like? Let’s get
out the crystal ball. The average fore-
casted outlays of the Commodity
Credit Corporation, $16.5 billion,
represents about one third of total
annual net cash farm income. This
only signifies the importance of farm
program payments to the near future
of agriculture. Since we likely will
not abandon farm subsidies anytime
soon, we need to examine where that
funding might go. Green payments,
such as the CSP program, hold real
potential for environmental benefit
while retaining producer income sup-
port. The upside to such a policy
would be increased environmental
protection and reaching compliance
in the World Trade Organization.
The WTO does not view conserva-
tion payments (unlike other subsi-
dies) as distorting international trade,
as long as they are used to make con-
servation gains. The downside to
such programs is the cost associated
with them. In a green payment sys-
tem such as the CSP, almost every
producer would be entitled to pay-
ments, not just those growing spe-
cific crops. Moving to such payments
could decrease productivity, essen-
tially driving up food prices. They
require more planning and input
from agencies like the NRCS, costing
more money and further intruding
on the farmers’ independence. It will
be interesting to see where the
tradeoffs will be made among Ameri-
cans’ desire for a healthy environ-
ment, low taxes, cheap food, a
profitable agricultural sector, and a
dynamic rural economy. In an age of
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big budget deficits, it is probably safe
to assume that we might not see a
switch to solely green payments in
the next farm bill, but rather a fight
to keep the conservation payments
we currently have. It is more likely
that we will see a reform in the way
direct payments are made to produc-
ers with continued countercyclical-
type payments to buffer against the
bad years. If the best indicator of
future behavior is past behavior, we
should not expect revolutionary
changes in Congress’s handling of the
next farm bill, but rather continued
evolutionary change of conservation
policy and continued support for
some level of commodity payments
and disaster relief. A recent initiative
by some agricultural lobbying groups
suggests declining support for acreage
retirement programs and increasing
support for full production. The bal-
ance between the desires of these
groups and the environmental con-
cerns of other groups remains to be
seen.
Conclusions
During the Great Depression the fed-
eral government began a system that
invested in the rural agricultural
economy to help farmers face tough
times. Before this time, the USDA
provided research, marketing, and
extension services. Now they were
attempting to provide income and
crop price support to the impover-
ished American farmer. The mode of
this funding ended up being conser-
vation programs, and the govern-
ment spent greatly, as indicated in
Table 1. This program continued to
evolve over the decades, changing
from a vehicle of income, price, and
supply control into an environmental
resource management program that
only occasionally manipulates
income, price, and supply. Early farm
bills sought to help the producer con-
trol erosion and increase productivity
of the land; later acts attempted to
control the overall supply of com-
modities to boost prices. Since 1985,
great strides have been made in con-
servation titles of our nation’s farm
bills, bringing into focus the true
importance of the balance of natural
ecosystems and production agricul-
ture. We are far from finished with
this task; there are still many prob-
lems of production agriculture that
need to be reconciled. This will be
the duty of future farm bills—to con-
tinue to provide farmers the opportu-
nity to become better stewards of the
land. The future of green payments
will likely be a function of time,
available dollars and congressional
will.
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Implications of Budget Reconciliation for 
Commodity Programs
James Richardson and Joe Outlaw
There appears to be a renewed emphasis in Washington
on reducing the federal budget deficit. Although the US
economy is improving, it appears that the only way to
make real progress in reducing the deficit is to reduce gov-
ernment expenditures.  The desire to reduce the deficit,
coupled with the President’s agenda that includes several
controversial and potentially costly items, has many in
Washington discussing the possibility of budget reconcilia-
tion for fiscal year 2005/06 after a budget resolution is
passed in 2005.
The details and intricacies of budget reconciliation are
far beyond the scope of this paper. In general, however, if
budget reconciliation happens, the budget committees will
send instructions to authorizing committees indicating the
amount of the required spending reductions relative to
baseline spending. It will then be up to the authorizing
committees (the agriculture committees in the case of
most agricultural programs) to decide what programs are
cut and by how much—as long as the required overall
reduction is achieved. At this point, there is only specula-
tion about what programs would be cut, but the agricul-
ture committees would have a wide range of programs to
choose from, including nutrition, export assistance, con-
servation, and commodity programs, to name a few.
Producers and their groups are having a hard time
accepting the prospects of cuts in program benefits. They
cite the fact that commodity program spending has been
less than projected by the Congressional Budget Office
(CBO) over the past few years due to higher actual prices
than were projected. In their mind, this results in savings
to the federal government, and they shouldn’t be asked to
take cuts. Unfortunately for producers, in the world of
budget scoring, lower payments due to higher commodity
prices do not represent budget savings.
The purpose of this paper is to discuss a few of the
alternatives available to the agriculture committees for
achieving budget reductions from commodity programs.
The three primary mechanisms used to provide support to
covered crops produced by US farmers are the countercy-
clical payment program (CCP), the marketing loan/loan
deficiency payment program (ML/LDP), and direct pay-
ments (DP). The fact that these programs are interrelated
has the potential to create additional issues that should be
addressed prior to implementing changes to avoid unin-
tended consequences (Table 1).
A hypothetical example is provided assuming that a
10% reduction in March 2004 CBO baseline spending
levels is required over the 2005–2014 period. To project
budget savings, a stochastic simulation model was devel-
oped to imitate the CBO budget scoring process and the
results of achieving savings by implementing reductions in
target prices, loan rates, direct payment rates, and the pay-
ment fraction. CCPs and ML/LDPs are received when the
market price is less than the program’s respective trigger
level. As a result, a deterministic model, which uses mean
prices, fails to score reductions in target prices and loan
rates as a budget saving. A stochastic model, on the other
hand, simulates the full distribution of prices, so any
decreases in target prices and loan rates result in budget
savings. It should be noted that changes could also be
made to payment limits to achieve budget savings
(although this paper does not consider payment limits).
The example will discuss the consequences of (a)
reducing target prices that would reduce CCPs; (b) reduc-
Table 1. Impact of a decrease in current farm policy 
instruments on CCPs, DPs, and ML/LDPs.
Policy tool CCP DP ML/LDP
Reducing target price Decrease No change No change
Reducing loan rate Increase No change Decrease
Reducing direct payment rate Increase Decrease No change
Reducing payment fraction Decrease Decrease No change
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ing the direct payment rate that
would reduce DPs; (c) reducing loan
rates that would reduce ML/LDPs;
and (d) reducing the 0.85 payment
fraction used in the calculation of
DPs and CCPs—essentially lowering
both of these payments.
2004 CBO Baseline
The CBO develops baseline budget
projections to give Congress a base-
line to measure the effects of pro-
posed changes in law against (CBO,
2002). For agriculture, CBO projects
government expenditures, by pro-
gram and crop, assuming a continua-
tion of the current farm bill for 10
years. As a point of reference, the
2004 CBO baseline, projected CCP,
DP, and ML/LDP payments for the
nine major program crops is about
$120.5 billion over the 2005–2014
period. Total DPs for nine crops
(corn, wheat, cotton, grain sorghum,
barley, oats, rice, soybeans, and pea-
nuts) is estimated at $49.7 billion,
whereas CCPs and ML/LDPs are
$36.7 billion and $29.1 billon,
respectively. It should be pointed out
that current projections of market
prices over the next few years are sig-
nificantly lower than were projected
in the example baseline (2004 CBO
March baseline). This means that the
2005 CBO baseline that will be used
for measuring savings will likely have
significantly greater projected CCP
and ML/LDP expenditures.
For this paper, the stochastic bud-
get scoring model was optimized
using optimal control theory to esti-
mate the decreases in target prices,
loan rates, direct payment rates, or
payment fraction to achieve a 10%
budget savings. The model was opti-
mized once with an across-the-board
percentage change in a policy variable
(e.g., target price) to achieve the bud-
get savings. Next, the model was
optimized once for each commodity
to find the percentage decrease in a
policy variable (e.g., target price) to
achieve a 10% budget savings for
each crop.
Target Prices
Cutting target prices will reduce
CCPs. Countercyclical payments are
a safety-net payment triggered when
season average price falls below the
target price minus the direct payment
rate. The CCP is paid on a historical
yield (created in the 2002 Farm Bill)
and base acreage, which is then
reduced by the 0.85 payment frac-
tion.
Using the 2004 CBO Agriculture
baseline, it is estimated that a 4.5%
cut in target prices would result in a
10% savings in government pay-
ments for the nine program crops
over the 2005–2014 period. The
problem with an across-the-board cut
of target price is that it may not be an
equitable way to achieve a budget
reconciliation spending cut. The
2004 CBO baseline indicates that
corn, wheat, and rice receive 30–
33% of their payments from the
CCP. In comparison, soybeans
receive only 14% of total payments
from CCPs, while peanuts and cot-
ton receive more than half of their
payments from CCPs. An across-the-
board cut in target prices to achieve
budget reconciliation instructions to
cut spending would negatively
impact soybeans, wheat, rice, and
corn relatively more than cotton and
peanuts. In other words, an across-
the-board cut reduces the expendi-
tures for some commodities more
than others. Is this equitable?
Direct Payment Rate
Cuts to the direct payment rate
would reduce DPs but increase
CCPs. As the direct payment rate
decreases, the CCP rate increases (in
the absence of a change in the target
price). Recall that the CCP rate
equals target price less the direct pay-
ment rate minus the greater of the
season average price and the loan
rate. As a result, cutting the direct
payment rate offers only limited ben-
efits to meeting a budget reconcilia-
tion target, because rising CCPs
offset DP cuts. Based on the 2004
CBO baseline for 2005–2014, it is
estimated that a 50% cut in direct
payment rate only saves 3% of
spending to nine program crops, and
cutting direct payment rates to zero
only reduces federal spending for
program crops by 5% because of
increases in CCPs.
Additionally, the DP is a certain
payment, whereas CCPs are risky.
Therefore, cutting the direct pay-
ment rate to zero to achieve a 5%
budget savings reduces producers’
utility. Producers would lose $49.7
billion of certain DPs to gain access
to uncertain CCPs. Another concern
about cutting direct payment rates is
that the DP is a decoupled payment,
which was not included in the WTO
cotton case brought against the
United States by Brazil (see Mercier
paper, in this issue).
Loan Rate
Reducing the loan rate will reduce
ML/LDPs and increase CCPs (in the
absence of other changes). To the
extent that loan rates exceed produc-
ers’ expected prices, loan rates
encourage increases in supply. So, a
reduction in loan rates can be
expected to reduce the production
over which ML/LDPs are paid. How-
ever, as the loan rate falls, the maxi-
mum CCP rate increases. Using the
2004 CBO baseline, it is estimated
that a 17% cut in loan rates for the
nine major program crops would
reduce government payments to
these crops 5%. (Note that this calcu-
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lation ignores the supply response of
lower loan rates.) With 17% lower
loan rates, CCPs would rise about
$10 billion—more than offsetting
the $4.7 billion decline in ML/LDPs.
This leads to the conclusion that cuts
in loan rates are not a feasible option
for reducing spending on the nine
program crops.
Equity issues would also occur
with cuts in the loan rate. In the
2004 CBO baseline, cotton receives
only 2% of its government payments
from ML/LDPs, whereas soybeans
receive 53% of their payments from
LDPs. Corn, wheat, and rice receive
about 20% of their payments from
ML/LDPs. Therefore, an across-the-
board percentage cut in loan rates to
meet budget reconciliation instruc-
tions to cut spending would mean
soybeans would be footing most of
the required budget savings for other
crops (corn, wheat, rice, and cotton).
Payment Fractions
A payment fraction of 0.85 is used to
reduce the DP and CCP by 15% in
the 2002 Farm Bill. Cutting the pay-
ment rate fraction is a simple way to
reduce government payments.
Reducing the payment rate fraction
from 0.85 to 0.74 would yield an
estimated 10% reduction in govern-
ment payments for the nine program
crops over the 2005–2014 period.
Producers would probably dislike this
approach, because it reduces the cer-
tain DPs, and it makes some crops
pay less than their share of the budget
cuts. Cotton and peanuts receive
about 97% and 89%, respectively, of
their government payments in the
form of DPs and CCPs, whereas soy-
beans receive only 47% of their pay-
ments from DPs and CCPs. Rice,
corn, and wheat receive roughly 80%
of their government payments from
DPs and CCPs, so they would not
prefer cuts in the payment fraction
rate. Soybean producers, however,
may prefer this method of achieving
a budget reconciliation reduction,
because they receive a relatively
smaller portion of their government
payments from CCPs and DPs.
Summary
Under the 2004 CBO baseline, the
projected CCP, DP, and ML/LDP
program payments for the nine major
crops is $120.5 billion over the
2005–2014 period. It is anticipated
that Congress will pass a budget rec-
onciliation bill in 2005 requiring the
House and Senate Agriculture Com-
mittees to comply with the budget
reconciliation guidelines. The provi-
sions of the 2002 Farm Bill make it
difficult for the agriculture commit-
tees to cut payments by simply cut-
ting target prices, loan rates, or direct
payment rates.
A cut in the direct payment rate
or cut in the loan rate increases
CCPs. Cutting the payment fraction
is the easiest tool to use, but it
reduces both DPs and CCPs, making
farmers worse off than simply cutting
target prices and reducing an uncer-
tain government payment.
Across-the-board cuts are easier
to manage but raise significant equity
issues. Cuts in loan rates put the bur-
den of budget savings for the whole
farm bill disproportionately on com-
modities that benefit more from
LDPs. Similarly, cuts in target prices
put a greater burden on a different
group of commodities. To reduce the
impacts of equity issues, the agricul-
ture committees may need to con-
sider reducing policy variables
differently for each of the commodi-
ties.
A common ground that all pro-
gram commodity producers share is a
preference for DPs over CCPs and
LDPs. Expected utility theory sug-
gests that decision makers prefer a
certain income over a similar but
uncertain income. Any policy change
that reduces DPs so farmers have to
rely more on LDPs and CCPs will be
met with disfavor.
For More Information
Congressional Budget Office. (2002) 
The Congressional Budget Office: 
Who We Are and What We Do. 
The Congress of the United 
States, Congressional Budget 
Office, Washington D.C.
James Richardson is a regents profes-
sor and TAES faculty fellow in the
Department of Agricultural Econom-
ics at Texas A&M University, College
Station, Texas. Choices co-editor Joe
Outlaw is an associate professor and
extension economist in the Depart-
ment of Agricultural Economics at
Texas A&M University.
46 CHOICES 4th Quarter 2004
CHOICES
The magazine of food, farm, and resource issues
4th Quarter 2004 CHOICES 47
A publication of the
American Agricultural
Economics Association
4th Quarter 2004
©1999–2005 CHOICES. All rights reserved. Articles may be reproduced or electronically distributed as long as attribution to Choices and the American
Agricultural Economics Association is maintained. Choices subscriptions are free and can be obtained through http://www.choicesmagazine.org.
Severing the Link between Farm Program 
Payments and Farm Production: 
Motivation, International Efforts, and 
Lessons
Clayton W. Ogg and G. Cornelis van Kooten
Decoupling Farm Payments: Experience in the 
United States, Canada and Europe
Historically, farm program provisions distorted agricul-
tural production and resource use, in turn affecting agri-
cultural prices, trading partner relationships, levels of
government support, and environmental quality. Recog-
nizing this, the United States moved to “decouple” pro-
gram payments from production in 1996, but it
subsequently stepped back from this position in 2002
when it reestablished program yields and base acreages in
certain payment formulas. 
Although the EU and Canada have less experience
with decoupling mechanisms, they are pursuing different
and potentially useful options. In this paper, we review
experience with decoupling in the United States, Canada
and Europe, attempting to glean something about options
for future farm policies. 
Why Might We Want to Decouple?
Price-support payments often provide incentives for farm-
ers to increase production, which typically involves
expanded use of chemicals and cropping on marginal
lands. Decoupling government payments from production
eliminates incentives to overproduce. Decoupling also
addresses depressed regional and global prices that are the
result of overproduction in the major grain-growing
regions of the world. This can be important both domesti-
cally and internationally. Domestically, reducing produc-
tion incentives tends to reduce supply, which raises
commodity prices and lessens the need for farm income
support.  Internationally, decoupling enhances compliance
with World Trade Organization (WTO) rules that encour-
age countries either to decouple—to sever the link
between income support for farmers and production—or
to reduce the level of support payments, with sanctions
recommended against those countries that fail to achieve
progress in this regard. Finally, decoupling initiatives
address the domestic environmental damage that results
when price-support programs encourage greater use of
pesticides and fertilizers (which are pollutants), while
decreasing the damage from increased conversion of mar-
ginal lands (including wetlands and other natural areas) to
cropland as well as effect other environmentally sensitive
practices (tillage intensity, irrigation, etc.).
Background
Initiatives to liberalize trade in Europe and North America
have included modifications of the formulas used in mak-
ing payments to farmers. In 1996, the United States
adjusted the yield and base acreage used in computing
farmers’ payments in ways that reduced their distorting
effects on input use, trade, and the environment. A yield
history and fixed-base acreage had already become a fea-
ture of Canadian and European Union (EU) agricultural
support payments in 1991 and 1992, respectively. But
when the EU undertook their decoupling initiative in
2003/04, some member states began to modify the base
acreage used in their payment formula (Kelch & Normile,
2004), in a manner reminiscent of the United States’ back-
tracking on decoupling in 2002. 
The similarities in approach make it relatively easy to
describe US, Canadian and EU decoupling options and
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compare their effectiveness, although
subtle differences can greatly influ-
ence their effectiveness. The stakes
are high because payments that
encourage farmers to produce more
will undermine world prices, pressure
the domestic environment, and
increase the cost of everyone’s farm
programs.
Recent Decoupling Initiatives in 
the United States, Canada, and 
the EU
We begin with the US experience,
because the United States was first to
attempt complete decoupling of the
links between payments and farm
production processes. Further, we
find that Canada and the EU pursue
options similar to those in the United
States, so they face similar challenges.
Decoupling in the United States. The
United States attempted to decouple
payment programs in 1996 by (a)
freezing the yield history used in
computing farmer payments (rather
than basing payments on recent
cropping history), (b) allowing plant-
ing flexibility (rather than requiring
farmers who choose to participate to
plant within their prior base acreage
for all crops), and (c) permitting
farmers to cease farming while still
receiving payments.
Although the first option was
implemented for nearly two decades
prior to 1996 without major contro-
versy, severing the link between farm-
ing and payments (the third option)
proved difficult to accomplish politi-
cally, because it went against most
people’s sense of fairness—producers
should be paid for producing some-
thing, not for sitting idly by. As a
consequence, the idea of decoupling
was looked upon by some with skep-
ticism. In 2002, the United States
allowed farmers to reestablish the
payment yields and/or base acreage
used in certain payment formulas.
Decoupling in Canada. Canada’s agricul-
tural programs, at least in the West,
are partly driven by the Canadian
Wheat Board (CWB) marketing
regime that bases quotas for eligible
grains on farmed area and thus
encourages farmers to cultivate as
much land as possible (Schmitz &
Furtan, 2000). In addition, the
“Crow” transportation subsidy and
feed freight assistance raised farm
gate prices, leading farmers to expand
cropland and farm more intensively.
It was not until 2000 that the effects
of the Crow subsidy and feed freight
assistance were eliminated. Mean-
while, there has been a move to
implement programs that enable
farmers to remain eligible for CWB
quota while converting some lands to
a long-term conservation use (such as
permanent pasture).
Canada replaced existing farm
programs in 1991 with the Net
Income Stabilization Account
(NISA), which is based on a five-year
average of recent net income, and the
Gross Revenue Insurance Program
(GRIP), which is based on a system
of base acreage and yield history,
much like the pre-1985 US
approach. NISA is decoupled from
the production decisions of farmers,
because it is paid on a lump-sum
basis, but GRIP bases payments on
individual farmer’s recent yields and
base acreage, excluding pasture and
forage crops, whereas other programs
provide producers with fuel rebates
and tax incentives. Such programs
encourage greater input use and pro-
duction to the detriment of the envi-
ronment (van Kooten & Folmer,
2004; Schmitz & Furtan, 2000).
Unlike the United States, Canada
relies on subsidies rather than conser-
vation compliance to counter adverse
effects of agricultural programs and
promote good environmental land
uses.
Decoupling in Europe. The framework
for price and support policy in the
EU, known as common market
organizations (CMOs), was devel-
oped over the period 1962–1969.
The 1992/93 MacSharry reforms
were the first attempt to decouple
agricultural payments from produc-
tion, although their primary purpose
was to reduce the overall level of sup-
port. The reforms sought to lower
EU prices toward the world price,
compensate farmers for the lower
prices via an income payment, and
impose land set asides on larger crop
producers. Agenda 2000 deepened
the MacSharry reforms and empha-
sized the environment and provision
of public goods. 
The decoupling initiatives in
these reform packages were not very
effective, as they were only imple-
mented on the largest farms (because
small farmers could not handle the
reporting requirements); many coun-
tries simply lacked the needed gover-
nance structures to implement the
reforms (Brümmer & Koester, 2004).
The June 2003 Luxembourg reform
attempts to address problems by
moving away from using a base acre-
age, relying instead on a payment
based on past payments (Kelch &
Normile, 2004). This avoids the
temptation for nations to reestablish
their acreage base, which shifts over
time in any event.
Effectiveness of Decoupling 
Options
What can we say about the effective-
ness of decoupling initiatives across
regions and approaches? In compar-
ing the effectiveness of decoupling
options, we consider options for (a)
determining yields in payment for-
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mulas, (b) providing planting flexi-
bility, and (c) allowing payments on
land no longer farmed.
Freezing Payment Yields. Hertel, Tsi-
gas, and Preckel (1990) projected
that continuing to keep payment
yields frozen under the 1990 U.S.
farm legislation would reduce US
variable input use (including chemi-
cal use) by 8%, while benefiting farm
incomes, reducing commodity pro-
gram outlays, and reducing distor-
tions in world prices. A key challenge
identified in the analysis (but not
addressed in the legislation) was the
need to update payment yields,
because farmers want payments to
increase with actual yields, which
tend to increase over time (although
differentially across the country).
They anticipated that if the Food,
Agriculture, Conservation, and Trade
Act of 1990 had indexed payment
yields in each state, the mounting
pressure to reestablish payment yields
on farms (which occurred in the
2002 Farm Bill) could be mitigated.
Addressing US payment yields by
freezing them and then applying an
index offers one of the least disrup-
tive decoupling options, because pay-
ments are still linked to farm-level
crop yields.
When the EU introduced their
version of a commodity payment sys-
tem for several major commodities,
they employed a regional yield that
was not tied to yields on any individ-
ual farm, thus avoiding from the out-
set the above problems associated
with reestablishing payment yields.
(Canada previously used regional
yields in its crop insurance program,
although that program is now part of
GRIP, which does not use regional
yields.) Using regional yields in pay-
ment formulas results in a partial
decoupling of payments, as govern-
ment payments to farmers do not
encourage them to apply more chem-
icals per acre to increase their future
subsidy payments. (As noted above,
the United States attempted some-
thing similar through its freezing of
payment yields.)
The payment formulas discussed
in our analysis constitute a major, but
by no means the total, share of the
EU, US, and Canada’s potentially
trade-distorting farm programs.
Export subsidies and various other
protectionist devices also continue to
distort agricultural prices, produc-
tion, and trade. However, recent
moves toward a greater reliance on
payments (especially in the EU), as
opposed to export subsidies, enhance
the opportunities offered by our
three decoupling options. The need
for support payments of any kind are
lowered whenever countries reduce
output (by decoupling and/or reduc-
ing levels of support), thereby
encouraging higher global prices. 
Allowing Planting Flexibility. In the US,
environmental concerns that com-
modity programs allegedly encour-
aged monoculture of grain crops
provided one rationale for the early
emphasis on planting flexibility. His-
torically, soybeans were not a pro-
gram crop, but were needed for their
environmental benefits in a crop
rotation with corn. In practice, how-
ever, granting farmers planting flexi-
bility proved much less
environmentally beneficial than
hypothesized. According to Babcock
et al. (1997), the US experiment with
planting flexibility in the 1996 Farm
Bill did lead to significant crop acre-
age shifts; these shifts included a
23% increase in soybean acreage,
which provided additional opportu-
nities for crop rotation with Mid-
western corn, as expected. However,
they found that soybeans also
replaced 3 million acres of wheat in
Kansas and 800,000 acres of CRP
land. Thus, one can conclude that
the net effect of increased planting
flexibility in the 1996 Farm Bill was
only a modest gain for the environ-
ment (Babcock et al., 1997).
The MacSharry reform in Europe
allowed considerable planting flexi-
bility from the beginning, so the
EU’s payment system had some mar-
ket-oriented features since the early
1990s. Planting flexibility increases
efficiency because it allows farmers to
plant the most profitable crops,
thereby reducing the financial bur-
den of agricultural support programs,
but environmental benefits are less
clear. 
Allowing Commodity Payments on Land
No Longer Farmed. Permitting farmers
to exit agriculture and still receive
government payments offers an
important policy option, particularly
in North America where agriculture
is much more extensive (especially in
the Northern Plains). Commodity
payments have shifted the extensive
margin of cultivation and increased
output on marginal lands. In spite of
earlier efforts to change this, the
United States allowed farmers in
2002 to reestablish the base acreage
used in certain payment formulas.
The problem in the EU is that
member countries have flexibility to
design their own country-specific
approaches to decoupling; this may
lead to payments on land that is no
longer farmed in some countries, but
not all. For example, individual
countries may offer coupled pay-
ments that are allowed on up to 25%
of the area for arable crops (Kelch &
Normile, 2004). Some countries
apparently favor further development
of payment systems tied to an acreage
base, following the US approach. 
Unlike the United States, Cana-
dian programs are weaker in address-
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ing environmental concerns: They
contain no Sodbuster or Swamp-
buster provisions, for example, so
they have been implicated in a major
loss of prairie wetlands and in the
resulting decline of ducks, shore-
birds, and other migratory bird spe-
cies (van Kooten, 1993). As noted
above, Canada has taken steps toward
decoupling, but payments to farmers
under GRIP and some other pro-
grams (usually “emergency” pay-
ments when prices are considered too
low) are still based on area “under
cultivation,” as is the case under the
Wheat Board marketing system,
which is similar to the approach used
in the United States for decades.
Other Remedies
There are other ways to address pro-
grams’ tendencies to increase the
acreage cropped that are relevant to
the decoupling topic. The Conserva-
tion Reserve Program idles over a
tenth of US cropland and is joined
by Sodbuster and Swampbuster pro-
grams, all of which address the ten-
dency for price supports to expand
production onto marginal crop-
land—to shift the extensive margin
of agriculture and encroach upon
nature. The EU recently introduced a
10% set-aside on larger farms, which
is similar to the proportion of crop-
land idled by the CRP in the United
States (but not targeted to achieve
environmental benefits), and the EU
introduced a reserve for tree planting
to combat greenhouse gases. Canada
is also set to provide payments to
farmers to plant trees to earn offset
credits under Kyoto, although it is
discovering that this may be more
expensive than originally anticipated.
These green payment mecha-
nisms may appease trading partners
as they compensate, to some degree,
for the program-induced increases in
area cropped. However, they do so at
a cost. If programs initially were
designed in a way that avoids encour-
aging farmers to put more land into
crop uses, costs of cropland idling
programs could be reduced or
avoided.
So What Have We Found?
Although the United States achieved
an early start in decoupling payment
mechanisms, the United States
stepped back from fully decoupling
payments in 2002. It is our view that
policy revisions are needed to allow a
recommitment to decoupling and
reap its benefits. Namely, we feel
there is a need to (a) establish a for-
mula for payment yields that
advances with time but is not farm
specific, and (b) allow farmers to
receive payments even if they cease
growing a crop.
Although the EU and Canada
have less experience with decoupling,
they pursue some relatively effective
decoupling options. Canada’s NISA
program is a step in that direction.
The EU may still fail to achieve fully
its goals related to decoupling
because they allow member states
considerable flexibility, and some of
them are already moving toward a
system of base acreage, which pre-
sumably would need to be reestab-
lished in the future, as acreage shifts
over time.
We conclude that the EU and
North America have reached a criti-
cal juncture, as they have the oppor-
tunity to pursue relatively painless
decoupling-based remedies to costly
trade distortions and environmental
problems caused by domestic agricul-
tural policies.
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Tracking and Testing Of US and Canadian 
Cattle Herds for BSE: A Risk Management 
Dilemma
Louis Anthony Cox, Jr., John J. VanSickle, Douglas A. Popken, and Ranajit Sahu
The United States has historically imported a substantial
number of cattle from Canada. Given the discovery of a
BSE-infected animal in Canada and another in the United
States with Canadian heritage raises the question as to
whether the United States should track and test imported
animals. One alternative for the near term is to identify,
permanently mark, and track Canadian cattle in the
United States. We will use economic analysis to quantify
and compare risk management and economic conse-
quences of such an alternative in an effort to help policy
analysts and decision makers decide how best to assess and
manage uncertain risks of BSE in the United States from
imported cattle.
Background
Canada has tested thousands of cattle per year for Bovine
Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE)—3,377 animals in
2002—but has found only one cow with BSE. In the
province of Alberta where the infected animal was found,
“the brains of 2,769 targeted cattle were tested from Octo-
ber 1996 to March 31, 2004. One cow, condemned at
slaughter (did not enter the human food chain), was con-
firmed positive for BSE in May 2003.... Brain tissue sam-
ples from the remaining 2768 cattle had no evidence of
BSE” (Government of Alberta, 2004). The Canadian cat-
tle tested included animals that exhibited neurological
signs and/or emaciation as well as postmortem samples
submitted to provincial diagnostic laboratories. If, based
on European experience, targeted animals are about 60
times more likely to have BSE than nontargeted animals
(Doherr et al., 2001), then the prevalence rate of BSE
among nontargeted cattle would be about six per million
cattle ((1/2,768) • (1/60)).
In December 2003, a second dairy cow from Alberta,
imported into the United States to the state of Washing-
ton, was also diagnosed with BSE. The United States
Department of Agriculture’s APHIS Veterinary Services
(VS) issued an “Explanatory Note” in February 2004, fol-
lowing an investigation by the USDA and the Canadian
Food Inspection Agency (CFIA). The note concluded that
the previous risk analysis of Canadian cattle and beef
products imported into the United States remained
unchanged by the new case and that the risks remained
low. They noted that both of the BSE cases of Canadian
origin occurred in cattle born before the implementation
of the feed ban on the use of animal neurological matter in
livestock feed, which is alleged to be the main way the dis-
ease spreads (USDA, 2004).
The detection of two BSE cases from Alberta in less
than eight months raises the question: What is the current
prevalence of BSE in Canadian cattle? From a risk man-
agement perspective, the key question is what actions, if
any, should be taken given the uncertainty about the true
prevalence of BSE in Canadian cattle. This decision prob-
lem is made more challenging by high economic stakes
and by scientific uncertainties regarding BSE sources, res-
ervoirs, and dynamics. Additionally, false positives might
be economically damaging—the USDA’s reports of
unconfirmed BSE cases that turned out to be false had
market impacts.
Scientific unknowns make predictive modeling highly
uncertain, creating a dilemma for both health and eco-
nomic risk management. Experience since 2003 has shown
that the presence of confirmed BSE cases dramatically
reduces US beef exports, even when the infected animals
originated outside the United States. If the true prevalence
of BSE in Canadian cattle shipped to the United States
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were known to be as high as six per
million head, then continued preven-
tion of cattle imports from Canada
might be expected. On the other
hand, if the prevalence of BSE in
Canadian cattle were known to be
much smaller or zero, then the
advantages of trade could be gained
by allowing unrestricted imports.
Given the high economic stakes and
uncertainties, it has been difficult to
decide or objectively evaluate what
policies would best promote US and
international interests. Options range
from the status quo (preserving cur-
rent import restrictions and testing
programs) to tightening or loosening
import policies. Another alternative
involves gathering more information
before deciding. This might be done
by tracking and testing Canadian cat-
tle as they enter and live in the
United States and then using this
information in support of decisions
on import restrictions. Discovery of
which of these (or other) options is
most desirable requires comparing
their associated chances of gains and
losses.
Formulating the Risk 
Management Decision Problem
Figure 1 outlines the decision alter-
natives to be compared in a sequen-
tial manner. An initial (Stage 1)
decision whether to track Canadian
cattle in the US (“Track CD
imports”) or not to track them (“Do
not track CD imports”) is followed
by arrival of additional information
from ongoing sampling and BSE
testing programs in the US and Can-
ada. If the Stage 1 decision was
“Track CD imports,” then in the next
year, any of the following informative
events may be observed:
• no new BSE cases are detected;
• BSE case(s) of Canadian origin
are detected in the United States;
• BSE case(s) of US origin are
detected in the United States; or
• BSE case(s) of Canadian origin
are detected in Canada.
If the Stage 1 decision is “Don’t track
CD imports,” then the four possible
observations for the next period are
Figure 1. Decision tree for BSE testing policy.
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aggregated to only the following
three:
• no new BSE cases are detected;
• new BSE case(s) are detected in
Canada; or
• new BSE case(s) are detected in
the United States.
A Stage 1 decision to track imports
increases the chances that the origin
of a new case can be determined. 
After the Stage 1 decision, and
given updated information about any
new BSE cases, a subsequent (Stage
2) decision will be made about
whether to sell and process healthy-
appearing cattle without first requir-
ing them to be tested for BSE (“No
required test”), versus requiring all
US cattle to be tested for BSE before
being sold or processed (“Test all”),
versus requiring only all Canadian
cattle in the United States to be
tested for BSE before being sold or
processed (“Require testing for CD
cattle only”). The latter option is
available only if the Stage 1 decision
was to track Canadian cattle imports.
Stage 2 decisions will be made condi-
tional on the information available
then. For example, if a new BSE case
of unknown origin is detected in the
United States, then the best Stage 2
decision might be to test all US cattle
at slaughter to reduce export and
domestic losses; if the origin of the
case is known to be Canadian and
the Stage 1 decision was to track
Canadian imports, then the best
Stage 2 decision might be to require
testing for Canadian cattle only.
Estimated Economic 
Consequences of Detecting 
Additional BSE Cases
Given this decision problem, one
may estimate the economic costs
associated with each terminal node
(i.e., “leaf ” node) at the tips of Figure
1. Three types of costs will be consid-
ered: tracking costs, testing costs, and
market costs. Tracking costs are esti-
mated to be $30.7 million and repre-
sent the cost of permanently marking
each live animal coming into the
United States, including labor and
materials. Testing costs represent the
costs of the BSE tests, including kits,
labor, shipping, holding, laboratory
facilities, and expenses. Testing all
cattle in the United States is esti-
mated to total $1.09 billion. Testing
Canadian cattle only would cost
$47.3 million, and testing only those
animals that fail an initial screening
test would cost $2.4 million.
Market costs represent market
losses (or gains) associated with each
second-stage outcome as a function
of all that occurred up to that point.
These costs are dependent on the
source of the BSE animal and the
type of tracking and testing programs
in place when the discovery occurs.
These impacts range from a loss of
$12.2 billion when there is a case of
BSE in the United States from a US
animal to a gain of $1.3 billion when
there is a case of BSE in Canada and
tracking of Canadian cattle in the
United States. The full set of possible
outcomes can be found in Cox et al.
(2004).
BSE Decision Consequences
The economic consequences of
tracking Canadian cattle imports
depend on the chances as to whether
and where BSE is detected. The
probabilities of the different eco-
nomic consequences, given the
choices of Stage 1 and Stage 2 deci-
sions, are estimates of the probabili-
ties of finding one or more BSE-
positive cattle among each batch of
1,000 tested. The probabilities of the
different outcomes were estimated
from data collected following the dis-
covery of the first BSE animal in
Canada. The full set of probabilities
can be found in Cox et al. (2004).
Consequences of Decisions in the 
Base Case
Under the baseline assumptions, the
expected net cost to track imports is
$10.3 million per year, while the
expected cost to do not track imports
is $90.0 million per year. Thus, the
expected net economic value of the
information provided by tracking is
$79.7 million per year, reflecting a
much higher probability of large
market losses when imports are not
tracked. Such large results occur
because without tracking, BSE cases
of Canadian origin in the United
States cannot be distinguished from
(and therefore have the same eco-
nomic impact as) BSE cases of US
origin. The least-cost rule then is to
track Canadian cattle imports, then
continue limited sampling in Stage 2
no matter what occurs. In other
words, the benefit from tracking in
this case does not come from avoid-
ing the cost of 100% testing of US
cattle, because this is costly. Rather, it
comes from the assumed reduced loss
of US beef sales if the country of ori-
gin of a BSE case detected in the
United States is Canada and this can
be ascertained and announced.
A sensitivity analysis, where we
varied the probabilities and costs,
indicates that the dominance of this
decision is robust to many variations
in the input data, suggesting that the
model’s recommendation to begin
tracking may be well justified despite
remaining uncertainties. The eco-
nomic value of tracking information
comes primarily from limited export
losses and from avoiding the need to
test all US cattle to win back custom-
ers. Although the best second-stage
decisions vary across sensitivity anal-
ysis cases, most results agree that
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tracking is the optimal current deci-
sion, even while differing in their
precise (Stage 2 planning) reasons.
Impacts of Possible Win-Back of 
Export Markets
The above analysis pessimistically
assumes that the losses of US cattle
and beef export markets following
the discovery of a Canadian-origin
BSE case in December 2003 are per-
sistent and irreversible. If policies in
the United States result in recovery of
some of the lost export markets, then
the economic impacts from tracking
and testing could dwarf those calcu-
lated for the base case. For example,
under an assumption that aggressive
testing would allow the United States
to regain its lost exports (as long as
no confirmed BSE case of US origin
is discovered), the optimal strategy
becomes to immediately start track-
ing all Canadian cattle and, if a con-
firmed BSE case of Canadian origin
is found, to test all Canadian-origin
cattle in the United States prior to
export. In this case, the expected net
economic value of the information
provided by tracking increases to
$771.6 million per year.
Concluding Comments
This analysis suggests that the eco-
nomic value of information provided
by tracking of imports and imple-
mentation of testing programs in the
United States greatly exceeds its costs
for cattle that may be imported in the
future. For “legacy” Canadian cattle
that have already entered the United
States, moving quickly to locate and
start tracking them before any addi-
tional BSE cases are detected appears
to be well justified for almost any
plausible set of input assumptions,
provided that the cost per head is
kept within bounds (up to $35/head,
based on the sensitivity analyses for
the base case). If the costs per head
are too great to justify locating all leg-
acy animals, then location and track-
ing efforts should focus on the oldest
animals—those with the greatest risk
of becoming new BSE cases.
The analysis provided here
focuses on potential economic conse-
quences and risk management
options for possibly mitigating losses
if another BSE case is discovered in
the United States. The possibility
that some BSE cases might pose (cur-
rently unquantified) health risks of
variant Creutzfeldt Jakob Disease
(vCJD) to humans reinforces the
conclusions by increasing the impor-
tance of being able to identify the
origin of any new BSE cases quickly.
That tracking and testing may be
imperfect has sometimes been
advanced as a qualitative argument
for restricting or rejecting them. The
quantitative comparisons in the sen-
sitivity analyses suggest that this rea-
soning is usually not justified:
Measures that help to identify the
origins and prevalence of BSE cases
have high information value for
improving future risk management
decisions and creating additional risk
management options, even if they are
less than perfect.
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Coming Attractions
Resources and the Environment
Markets for Environmental Goods and Emissions
Transferable rights are increasingly being used to regulate
pollutant emissions or usage of environmentally sensitive
items. In turn, markets are developing to allow the
exchange of these rights among interested parties. In the
next issue of Choices, we explore the general motivation for
such approaches as well as market experience and/or issues
regarding trading sulfur dioxide emissions, rights to divert
water, water-pollutant-related emissions, and wetland
banking. Among these cases are market successes and dis-
appointments.
Agribusiness and Finance
The New Face of Agricultural Lending
The attempted acquisition of a major piece of the Farm
Credit System by Rabobank, a Dutch-based commercial
bank active in the global marketplace, is one of several top-
ics addressed in this theme. Although the sale ultimately
fell through, it left a number of issues in its wake. The
Basel II Capital Accords, which call for the adoption of
more risk-sensitive minimum capital requirements for
banking organizations, raise management issues for lend-
ers as well. The articles in this theme address these as well
as broader issues that are likely to have an impact on agri-
cultural lending.
We are working on future theme coverage on food
safety, supply chains, appraising nonmarket environmental
attributes, biofuels, US participation in the WTO, and
checkoff programs.
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